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ABSTRACT
The first chapter studies the effects of government capital accumulation on sovereign debt
default risk and debt restructuring renegotiation outcomes when a government has limited
ability to extract revenues from households. To do so, this chapter develops a quantitative
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and
fiscal policies, where the government chooses between the fiscal expenditures of govern-
ment consumption and government investment. Government capital provides an additional
means of adjustment in the face of a bad productivity shock. It also affects the government’s
incentive to re-access the international credit market when the government chooses to de-
fault. The model delivers three key predictions: (1) a higher level of government capital
implies less risky sovereign debt and higher recovery rates when the government chooses to
default; (2) a high debt to output ratio is sustainable with a sufficient level of government
capital; (3) fiscal adjustment that reduces public investment may be self-defeating.
The second chapter investigates the empirical facts that government expenditures and
taxes are procyclical in developing countries but countercyclical or acyclical in developed
economies. This chapter provides a possible explanation for this stylized fact by introducing
news about future total factor productivity and endogenous fiscal policy in an otherwise-
standard small open economy model of sovereign default risk, as in Arellano (2008). News
tends to be more precise in developed countries, which relaxes credit constraints on foreign
borrowing and makes developed countries less reliant on tax revenues. This dampens and
potentially reverses the high correlation between output and government expenditures/taxes
v
observed in developed countries.
The third chapter studies the impact of creditors’ income process on the outcomes of
sovereign debt restructurings. This chapter compiles a new dataset on foreign creditors’
income process during negotiation. This chapter shows that when foreign creditors are
facing high income, restructurings are protracted and result in smaller haircuts. To explain
these stylized facts, this chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of
defaultable debt that embeds multi-rounds negotiations between a risk-averse sovereign and
risk-averse creditors. The quantitative analysis shows that high creditors’ income results in
a longer duration of restructuring and higher haircuts.
vi
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Chapter 1
Sovereign Default Risk, Fiscal Adjustment, and
Debt Renegotiation
1.1 Introduction
How does government capital affect a government’s incentive to default on its sovereign
debt when the government has a limited ability to extract tax revenue from private sectors?
When sovereign countries default and renegotiate with foreign creditors, how does the level
of government capital affect the outcomes of debt restructuring renegotiation? Are there
any fiscal rules or policies that enable governments to manage foreign debt or government
spending more carefully such that a country is less vulnerable to negative shocks to the
economy? This paper investigates the above questions within a quantitative framework
that explicitly incorporates sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and government capital.
Recent European debt crises have ignited academic and policy debates on how to deal
with sovereign debt crises. Faced with the high cost of debt and risk of default, many gov-
ernments try to overcome their debt crisis by enacting fiscal austerity policies. However, a
package of fiscal austerity policies such as reducing social security, public goods and services,
and tax increases sparks social unrest and political instability leading to the replacement
of some governments by opposition parties.1 2 On the other hand, some countries try to
1Voth (2011) describes the political instability and social unrest during the austerity policy. He shows
that expenditure cuts and tax increase in a less extent carry a risk of riots, anti-government demonstrations,
general strikes, political assassinations, and attempts at revolutionary overthrow of the established order.
This may explain the delayed or not sufficient fiscal adjustment effort during the crisis.
2In Greece, three Prime Ministers (Papandreou, Papademos, and Pikrammenos) were replaced during
debt crises while in Argentina, four presidents took office during debt crises between 1999 and 2005.
2stimulate aggregate demand by borrowing more even though they are already debt ridden.3
These examples show how hard it is to adjust fiscal resources to cope with the debt crisis.
With the pressure from creditors to cut spending and to increase taxes, governments have
been tempted to adjust government finances by slashing investment spending rather than
transfers. As a result, both public investment and private investments are severely reduced
during debt crises. This is one of the main causes that was cited for the long-lasting and
sluggish economic recovery and financial autarky following debt default in the 1980s in Latin
America.4 As a result, several fiscal rules, such as the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability
of Growth Pact (SGP), were proposed to prevent potential debt crises in advance.5 These
fiscal rules, however, did not pay attention to the role of reduced government capital and
government investment during the period. To correct the shortcomings of the fiscal rules,
recent rule changes such as the Golden Rule of Public Finance have attempted to secure
government investment while limiting debt and deficit levels.6 In addition several tax poli-
cies have been proposed to collect government revenues without exposing the country to the
risk of default. Based on recent episodes and historical experience, we try to emphasize the
role of government capital in debt default and debt renegotiation as well as the effectiveness
of fiscal policies and rules in quantitative settings. 7
3When French President Hollande took office in 2012, he emphasized more growth-supporting measures
rather than the fiscal austerity measures led by Berlin.
4Easterly, Irwin, and Serven (2007) discuss the pitfalls of ”adjustment with growth” during macroeco-
nomic stabilization in Latin America in the 1990s and suggest that some types of fiscal austerity not only
fail to bring growth, they may not even bring ”adjustment” in the long run. Sachs (1990) comments on the
public investment in Latin America where the foreign credit squeeze was most severe in that governments
responded to the external shocks with a combination of spending cuts and increased domestic borrowing. In
cutting spending, public investment projects were the first to go, public sector real wages the second, and
public sector employment a distant third. See also Kuralbayeva (2013)
5The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 by the members of European Community, was to keep ”sound
fiscal policies, with debt limited to 60% of GDP and annual deficits no greater than 3% of GDP.” The
Stability of Growth Pact was to ensure that fiscal discipline would be maintained and enforced in the
European Monetary Union (EMU).
6The Golden Rule, first implemented in UK and soon to be followed by France, Germany, Spain, and
Italy, is the guideline for fiscal policy that restricts government borrowing to investment rather than funding
current consumption.
7Financial Times, July 3 2013, Brussels relaxes EU fiscal rules on infrastructure spending: Brussels is to
ease strict budget deficit rules to give EU countries more flexibility to make key public investments aimed
at boosting economic growth and lowering record unemployment
3This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of small open econ-
omy that incorporates sovereign default, debt renegotiation, and fiscal policy. Unlike most
previous papers on sovereign default, we separate the household and government to examine
the effect of government capital on default risk and debt renegotiation as well as on the
effectiveness of fiscal rules. 8 Government spending can be decomposed into government
consumption and government investment. Government consumption gives direct utility in
the current period and is considered as a non-productive component of government spend-
ing. Government investment, on the other hand, is a productive component of government
spending and one of the inputs in production function, which generates future consump-
tion. We can think of government consumption as social security, pensions, and transfers.
Government investment can be either physical capital, such as infrastructure, or human
capital, such as education, health, or R&D. In our model, government capital provides two
distinct roles in deciding to default or repay. First, government capital can be thought of as
a government saving tool. It plays a precautionary saving role in smoothing consumption.
Secondly, government capital can increase future output, enabling government to generate
more tax revenues in the future. Thus, the inclusion of government capital plays a significant
role in debt repayment and debt renegotiation. However, the distinction between private
capital and government capital is not important for this paper. Government capital can be
interpreted as the fraction of total capital of the economy that government can handle or
liquidate in times of crisis. If the government can control the whole capital, then aggregate
capital is government capital. In reality, however, the government cannot control much of
the total capital in the economy; therefore, we only consider capital that the government
can handle.
This paper endogenizes the debt renegotiation process by using a one-time Nash bar-
gaining framework. Similar to Yue (2010), if the country defaulted on its debt, the country
and foreign investors renegotiate over the recovery rate. Optimal recovery is derived to
8Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) separate household and government to see the impact of default
risk on pro-cyclical fiscal policy.
4maximize the joint surplus between the government and its creditors. Once the recovery
rate is determined and paid off by the country, it can re-access the international financial
market again with no debt. We do not try to get equilibrium delay in this model. Benjamin
and Wright (2008) investigated the optimal delay in debt renegotiation as well as recovery
rates.
The first contribution is to show that as government capital increases, the optimal
recovery rates tend to increase but in a diminishing manner for a given level of foreign
indebtedness and productivity. For sovereign borrowers, the surplus for the debt renegotia-
tion resolution is the difference between the value of the debt renegotiation agreement and
the value of autarky. As a government’s capital increases, the value of a debt renegotia-
tion agreement priced by a discount factor also increases. Intuitively, this implies that the
more capital the government has, the further the government will lose by failing to reach a
debt renegotiation agreement since exclusion from the international credit market reduces
the productivity of government capital. Thus, the country is likely to pay more to foreign
investors in order to re-access the international credit market sooner. However, when the
country already has a high level of government capital, the surplus of the debt renegotia-
tion agreement for the country will no longer increase, and optimal debt recovery rates will
remain same. While the value of autarky increases when capital increases as explained by
“autarky channel”in Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2013), we introduce the debt renego-
tiation process into the model and show that the value of returning to the credit market
is greater than the value of staying in financial autarky. Therefore, we underscore the role
of government capital in insurance even after a country’s default. We provide an analytic
characterization to explain why optimal recovery rates increase but in a diminishing manner
as capital increases. In section 6, we quantify this argument and show that the value of
debt renegotiation increases faster than the value of autarky, generating high recovery rates
in our calibrated economy.
The second contribution is to show that a high debt to output ratio can be sustained
with reasonable default frequency when the economy has a sufficient level of capital. If the
5government has more government capital, recovery rates tend to be high and the benefit of
default is reduced, thereby removing the incentive to default. As the government will pay
lower interest rates and can accumulate more government capital, defaulting becomes less
attractive. Therefore, even if the initial effect of government capital is small, an amplifica-
tion mechanism can generate enough safety for the given level of sovereign debt. However,
this amplification mechanism is absent in an endowment economy (Yue, 2010). Then, the
government can raise more debt from foreign investors and the riskiness of sovereign default
increases by a general equilibrium effect. Aguair and Gopinath (2006) generate a debt to
output ratio of 19% but with a very low default frequency of 0.92%. In Arellano (2008) and
Yue (2010), the figures are 5.95% and 10.13% respectively. On the other hand, D’Erasmo
(2010) can generate debt to output ratio of 40% by introducing a country’s reputation
mechanism and an endogenous debt renegotiation in an asymmetric information setting.
Pouzo and Presno (2012) study foreign investors’ concerns about model misspecification
and generate around 45% of a debt to output ratio. Our contribution is to deliver a high
debt to output ratio of 20% with default frequency of around 4% by introducing a govern-
ment capital and an endogenous debt renegotiation in a perfect information setting without
explicitly calibrating debt to output ratio. Although our model cannot generate the high
level of debt to output as seen in the data, we provide another mechanism in the right
direction. 9
The third contribution of this paper is that we investigate the effectiveness of fiscal rules
and policies. We implement debt ceiling fiscal rules, particularly focusing on government
spending dynamics. The first fiscal rule is the simplified Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),
where the foreign debt is limited by some exogenous level. Then we evaluate the modified
SGP, the Golden Rule, where some fraction of government investment is allowed by foreign
debt financing and other government spending is only financed from tax revenues. Moreover,
we implement various tax policies such as distortionary and non-distortionary tax systems.
Based on these experiments, we show that fiscal rules or policies that secure government
9In the model of Arellano and Bai (2013) where no capital exists, the debt to output ratio is around 5%
6investment and rely on non-distortionary tax systems generate a small loss for investors and
a low default risk in the long run.
The model is calibrated to match the Argentina economy during 1980-2001. We find that
the Argentina sovereign debt crisis is a suitable ground to test this model. Argentina’s fiscal
mismanagement is cited as one of the main culprits for sovereign debt crisis and default.10
Furthermore, there are major debates whether a fiscal adjustment policy is appropriate and
what kind of fiscal policies should be adopted to prevent the sovereign debt crisis.
Our paper is closely related to the work of Arellano and Bai (2013) in which a dynamic
model of government borrowing and default is investigated. They evaluate the effect of
increasing taxes during a debt crisis, when a government collects distortionary taxes to pay
interest payments and government consumption. Our model differs from their model in that
we divide government spending into government consumption and government investment.
Then we investigate the effect of government investment and government capital accumu-
lation on the incentive to default and on the outcomes of debt renegotiation. In policy
experiments, we evaluate not only the effect of a tax increase as Arellano and Bai (2013)
but we also study the effect of a fiscal rule on the dynamics of government spending.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related literature.
Section 1.3 presents empirical evidence of fiscal spending, sovereign default risk, and debt
renegotiation outcomes. Section 1.4 provides a theoretical model. Section 1.5 defines recur-
sive equilibrium. The calibration and quantitative implications will be discussed in section
1.6. Policy experiments will be conducted in section 1.7. Section 1.8 provides conclusions.
10Braun (2006) argues that Argentina’s federal fiscal institutions lead to a serious common pool problem
that in turn causes a deficit bias.
71.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the quantitative sovereign debt default literature.11 Since the
seminal paper of Eaton and Gersovits (1981), the sovereign debt default literature has
developed quantitatively. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) develop quan-
titative sovereign default models in endowment economies to generate equilibrium default
and volatile business cycle, which are commonly found in emerging economies.12 Along with
them, this paper is closely related to Arellano and Bai (2013), Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza
(2010) and Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2013). Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) de-
velop a dynamic small open economy model to endogenize fiscal policy and optimal default
under incomplete credit markets.13 Their model separates the household and government
to study endogenous fiscal policy and shows that default risk is the key to pro-cyclical
fiscal policy, which is frequently observed in emerging economies. Their paper identifies
government fiscal policies as government spending and tax rates. Even though their model
concerns production economy, labor is the only input in their production function. Our
paper introduces government capital as the other input in the production function and lets
government control the accumulation of capital. By endogenizing government capital accu-
mulation, we can investigate how government capital accumulation affects the incentive to
default or repay. Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2013) study the effect of physical capital
accumulation on the sovereign’s decision to default or repay. They investigate two oppos-
ing effects of physical capital accumulation, the smoothing role of capital, and the autarky
channel. Capital provides an additional role of saving in the face of a negative productivity
shock. This smoothing role alleviates an incentive to default, and default risk decreases.
11To name a few more. Political risk : Amador (2003), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Hatchondo, Mar-
tinez, and Sapriza (2009), Andreasen, Sandleris, and Van der Ghote (2013). Risk averse investor: Borri
and Verdelhan (2011), Lizarazo (2005), Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajsek (2013), Pouzo and Presno (2012).
Production economy: Mendoza and Yue (2012), Roldan (2012), Park (2012). Long-term debt: Hatchondo
and Martinez (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)
12Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) introduce shocks to trends and Arellano (200) uses asymmetric default
output cost to derive counter-cyclical interest rates.
13For pro-cyclical fiscal policy in emerging economy, see Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005), Pouzo
(2010), Ilzetzki (2011), and Kuralbayeva (2013)
8On the other hand, as capital stock accumulates in the country, the value of autarky in-
creases; this is an autarky channel. In this paper, we try to improve their prediction about
the value of autarky by introducing the debt renegotiation process. Furthermore, since the
household and the government are the same in their model, they cannot handle fiscal issues.
We separate the household and government, as Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), to
investigate the dynamics of government spending and the effectiveness of fiscal policies.
As mentioned above, we introduce the endogenous debt restructuring renegotiation pro-
cess in the model. Yue (2010) introduces a debt renegotiation of one-round Nash bargaining
game. By generating endogenous debt recovery rates, Yue (2010) can improve the model to
match debt reductions and business cycles statistics in defaulting countries. Benjamin and
Wright (2008) and Bi (2008) extend Yue (2008) by introducing a multi-period bargaining
model to derive equilibrium delays. Benjamin and Wright (2008) present a mechanism that
shows current and future surpluses of debt resolution are limited by the debtor’s limited
commitment problem. So both parties wait until a future default risk is low. Bi (2008) uses
the Merlo and Wilson (1995) framework of ”waiting-for-a-larger-cake” to generate beneficial
delays in debt restructuring. Asonuma (2012) extends Yue (2010) by considering not only
the recovery rates but also the increases in the rate of new debt at the time of debt renego-
tiation to study the behavior of serial default. D’Erasmo (2012) investigates the reputation
of a country along with the endogenous debt renegotiation in an asymmetric information
setting to derive a realistic debt to output ratio, which previous papers fail to deliver. Our
paper differs from these papers in that we investigate the role of capital accumulation on
the outcomes of debt renegotiation and default risk.14
Finally, this paper is related to the fiscal rule literature. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch
(2012) is closely related to this paper. They find the optimal target value of fiscal rules and
14Some of the sovereign debt renegotiation delay literatures are as follows: Pitchford and Wright (2012)
investigate a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditor
hold-up a settlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. In Bai and Zhang (2012),
delays in reaching agreements arise in equilibrium because the government uses costly delays to screen the
creditors’ reservation value. Asonuma and Joo (2015) present empirical evidence and a model that delay is
due to not only sovereign’s recovery in output but equally importantly creditors’ risk appetite.
9measure the aggregate effect in a quantitative sovereign default model. Their fiscal rule is
defined as a debt ceiling. In this paper, however, we focus on the effect of fiscal rules and
tax policies on government spending. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005) identify the errors
of The Stability of the Growth Pact (SGP) as a way of dealing with public investment.
Modifying the rule to exclude public investment from the SGP would drive debt-GDP ratio
to the ratio of public capital to GDP in their prediction. Minea and Villieu (2009) assessed
the effect of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in an endogenous growth model.
They study the effectiveness of the ”Golden Rule of Public Finance” and show that inter-
temporal welfare may increase or decrease, depending on consumption elasticity. In this
paper, we investigate how these fiscal rules and policies affect business cycles as well as
sovereign default risk.
1.3 Model Environment.
We investigate a small open dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sovereign
default, fiscal policies, and endogenous debt renegotiation. The government can issue one-
period zero coupon, non-contingent bonds to finance government spending. The government
has an option to default on this contract, but investors are always committed to the contract.
1.3.1 General points
Our model considers sovereign default and debt renegotiation with government capital in a
stochastic dynamic equilibrium model. We consider a risk-averse household, a risk-averse
government, and a risk-neutral creditor. The government cannot affect world risk-free
interest rates. Government expenditures can be decomposed into government consumption
(gt), government investment (it), and interest repayment. We assume an exogenous tax
policy to capture the country’s limited ability to raise resources from households. There are
two types of taxes, a consumption tax (τ) and a lump-sum tax (T ). The consumption tax
is distortionary while the lump-sum tax is non-distortionary. We assume that government
consumption is unproductive but gives utility directly whereas government investment is
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used as an input to the production function. We assume that it depreciates and contributes
to the existing capital stock.
The country receives an exogenous productivity shock at. The productivity shock (at)
is stochastic, drawn from a compact set A = [amin, amax] ⊂ R+. Given productivity at,
µ(at+1|at) is the probability distribution of a shock at+1 conditional on the previous real-
ization at. Foreign investors are risk-neural and have perfect information on the country’s
bond holdings, credit record, productivity, and the level of government capital.
The international capital market is incomplete. The government and foreign investors
can borrow and lend only via one-period zero-coupon bonds, where bt+1 denotes the amount
of bonds to be repaid next period. When the government purchases bonds, bt+1 > 0, and
when it issues new bonds, bt+1 < 0. The set of the amount of bonds is B = [bmin, bmax] ⊂ R,
where bmin ≤ 0 ≤ bmax. The upper bound is the highest level of assets that the government
can accumulate and the lower bound is the highest level of debts that the government can
hold. We assume q(bt+1,Kg,t+1, at) is the price of bonds with asset position (bt+1), govern-
ment capital (Kg,t+1) and a productivity shock (at). The bond price will be determined in
equilibrium.
We assume that foreign investors always commit to repay their debt. However, the
government is free to decide whether to repay its debt or to default. If the government
chooses to repay its debt, it will preserve access to the international credit markets next
period. If the government chooses not to pay its debt, it is subject to exclusion from the
international capital markets and suffers direct output cost. However, the government and
foreign investors can renegotiate for recovery rates. 15 16. Next period, the government
15The default penatly is estimated by several papers. Sturzeneger (2002) esimates output loss as around
2% of GDP. On the contrary, De Paoli, Hoggarth, and Saporta (2006) suggest that the output loss in the
wake of sovereign default apprears to be very large - around 7% a year on the median measure - as well
as long lasting. Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011) indicate that the trough of the contraction coincides with
the quarter of default, and that output starts to grow thereafter, implying negative impacts fo a default on
output is driven by anticipation of default, rather than default itself.
16Mendoza and Yue (2008) propose two explanations of output cost: inefficient production caused by
imperfect substitution between domestic and imported inputs and labor reallocation away from final good
production to production of domestic inputs. Gopinath and Neinman (2013) provide empirical evidences of
trade adjustment during the Argentine crisis and show significant heterogeneity in how firms adjusted their
import mix.
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can access the international credit markets if the country passes the renegotiated recovered
debt.
1.3.2 Timing of the model
Timing of decisions is summarized in Figure 1.
1. Period t starts. Productivity shock (at) is observed.
2. The government enters the period with a level of sovereign debt (bt) and public capital
(Kgt ). The payoff relevant state variables are debt holdings, the level of public capital,
and the productivity shock: (bt,K
g
t , at)
3. The government makes a default decision : dt ∈ [0, 1]
(a) If the government chooses to repay,
i. The household chooses consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt), given the
current government policies of government consumption (gt) and tax policies
(τ , T )
ii. The firm maximizes profit, given government capital (Kg,t)
iii. The government chooses new borrowing (bt+1), government consumption
(gt), government investment (K
g
t+1) given the optimal private sector’s deci-
sions
iv. Default probability and the bond price are determined in equilibrium and
foreign investors issue (bt+1) with this belief.
(b) If the government chooses to default, the country is excluded from the interna-
tional credit markets and suffers default output loss of productivity (h(A))
i. The household chooses consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt) given the
current government policies of government consumption (gt) and tax policies
(τ , T )
12
Figure 1.1: Timing of the model
ii. The firm maximizes profit, given government capital (Kg,t)
iii. The government chooses government consumption (gt) and government in-
vestment (Kgt+1) given the optimal private sector’s decisions.
iv. At the end of period t, the government and the foreign investors renegotiate
for the recovery rates (αt), the government repays the renegotiated debt
to the foreign creditors and re-access the international credit markets next
period.
1.4 Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, we define a stationary recursive equilibrium of the model.
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1.4.1 Household’s problem
A representative household chooses consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt) to maximize its
expected lifetime utility, given the government polices (gt, τ , T ).
max
ct,lt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, gt, 1− lt) , (1.1)
s.t. (1 + τt)ct = wtlt (1.2)
The per-period utility function is concave, strictly increasing, and twice differentiable.
Households earn an income from supplying labor to firms. The discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1)
and households get utility from private consumption, government consumption, and leisure.
The private component and public component in the utility function are separated with
the weight λ on government consumption.
U(ct, gt, 1− lt) = (1− λ)u(ct, lt) + λv(gt) (1.3)
We assume Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (GHH) per-period utility function to
exclude the effect of wealth on labor supply decisions. We will provide detailed specifications
in the calibration section. The household’s problem in this setting is static in that house-
holds are not allowed to access the international financial markets to smooth consumption.
The households provide labor supply, given the consumption tax policy.
Household’s first order condition is
ul
uc
= (
w
1 + τ
) (1.4)
Applying GHH utility form, we get
lt = (
w
1 + τ
)
1
ψ (1.5)
As seen in the optimality condition, the labor supply decision depends on the consump-
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tion tax τ . A high consumption tax rate induces less labor supply and, therefore, lower
output.
1.4.2 Firm’s Problem
Final goods production is subject to productivity shock At. Labor supply from households
and public capital from the government are inputs in this economy. Output is divided
into private consumption, public consumption, and public investment. The production
technology follows the Cobb-Douglas form:
AtF (lt) = AtK
θ
g,tl
1−θ
t (1.6)
The law of motions of public capital is as follows
Kg,t+1 = it + (1− δ)Kg,t (1.7)
Given the production function, a firm’s problem is to choose labor demand to maximize
the profits in the following equation.
max
lt
Πt = AtF (Kg,t, lt)− wtlt (1.8)
Notice that the public capital is given in this problem.
1.4.3 Determination of Government Policies
The government’s problem is to maximize the households’ expected lifetime utility. The
government makes a default decision and determines asset positions for the next period
(bt+1), government consumption (gt), government investment (it) and tax rates (τt), given
its current asset position (bt), productivity shock (at), public capital (Kg,t) and household’s
optimal decisions. The value function of the government is denoted by V (bt, at, st). For
bt > 0, the country has savings.
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For bt < 0, the country has debts. The government has the option to default on its debt.
If the government decides to pay its debt, it can choose its next-period’s asset position bt+1,
government consumption (gt), and tax rates (τt). If the government chooses to default, it
will be excluded from the international financial markets, and the government chooses only
government consumption (gt) and consumption tax policy (τt). Given the option to default,
V (bt,Kg,t, at) satisfies
V (bt,Kg,t, at) = max
[
V R(bt,Kg,t, at), V
D(bt,Kg,t, at)
]
(1.9)
where V R(bt,Kg,t, at) is the value associated with paying debts and V
D(bt,Kg,t, at) is the
value with defaulting debts. The optimal default decision of the government, then, is
characterized by
D(bt,Kg,t) =
{
at ∈ A : V R(bt,Kg,t, at) < V D (bt,Kg,t, at)
}
(1.10)
The default set D(bt,Kg,t) is defined over the set of productivity shock a ∈ A for a given
debt position (bt) and the level of government capital (Kg,t).
The value of repayment , V R, satisfies:
V R(b,Kg, a) = max
g,K′g ,b
′ u(c
∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (b
′
,K
′
g, a
′
)dµ(a
′ |a) (1.11)
s.t. g + i = τc∗ + T + b− q(b′ ,K ′g, a)b
′ − Ω
2
(K
′
g −Kg)2 (1.12)
K
′
g = i+ (1− δ)Kg (1.13)
ul
uc
=
AFl(l
∗,Kg)
(1 + τ)
(1.14)
(1 + τ)c∗ + T = AF (l∗,Kg) (1.15)
The government maximizes the household expected life time utility given the government
budget constraint, (1.12), the law of motion for government capital, (1.13), the private sector
16
optimality condition, (1.14), and the resource constraint, (1.15). The government budget
constraint specifies the source of revenue and expenditure. The government gets revenue
from household tax revenue, τc∗ + T , and net foreign borrowing, b − q(b′ ,K ′g, a)b
′
. When
the government adjusts the level of capital, capital adjustment costs incur, Ω2 (K
′
g −Kg)2.
The level of private consumption (c∗) and leisure (1− l∗) are obtained by equation (1.14).
The output that firms produce is factored into private consumption and tax revenues.
V D(bt,Kg, a) is the value associated with default.
V D (b,Kg, a) = max
g,K′g
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (0,K
′
g, a
′
)dµ(a
′ |a) (1.16)
s.t. g + i = τc∗ + T + α(b,Kg, a)b− Ω
2
(K
′
g −Kg)2 (1.17)
K
′
g = i+ (1− δ)Kg (1.18)
ul
uc
=
h(A)Fl(l
∗,Kg)
(1 + τ)
(1.19)
(1 + τ)c∗ + T = h(A)F (l∗,Kg) (1.20)
When the government defaults on its debt, the country is excluded from the international
credit markets. The government cannot issue debts in that period. Furthermore, the
country suffers a default penalty in the form of productivity loss, h(At). However, at the
end of the period, the country and its foreign investors can renegotiate for the recovery
rates of the defaulted debt. Endogenous debt recovery rates are determined in the debt
renegotiation process, and the country pays off the recovered debt. Then the country can
re-access the international credit markets.
1.4.4 Debt Renegotiation Problem
The debt renegotiation takes the form of a generalized Nash bargaining problem. Depending
on the level of debt, productivity shock, and the level of government capital, debt recovery
rates are determined through the debt restructuring renegotiation process. The value to
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the country when debt renegotiation is resolved is as follows:
V D(b,Kg, a) = max
τ,g,K′g
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (0,K
′
g, a
′
)dµ(a
′ |a) (1.21)
s.t. g + i = τc∗ + T + α(b,Kg, a)b− Ω
2
(K
′
g −Kg)2 (1.22)
K
′
g = i+ (1− δ)Kg (1.23)
ul
uc
=
h(A)Fl(l
∗,Kg)
(1 + τ)
(1.24)
(1 + τ)c∗ + T = h(A)F (l∗,Kg) (1.25)
When the restructuring renegotiation is resolved, the country has to pay recovered debt,
α(b,Kg, a)b and can re-assess the international credit markets next period with no debt on
hand.
In order to get the borrower’s surplus of debt resolution, we need to find the threat
point. The threat point of the bargaining game is that the country stays in permanent
autarky and the foreign investors get nothing.
The value of financial autarky is as follows:
V aut(Kg, a) = max
g,K′g
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (K
′
g, a
′
)dµ(a
′ |a) (1.26)
s.t. g + i = τc∗ + T − Ω
2
(K
′
g −Kg)2 (1.27)
K
′
g = i+ (1− δ)Kg (1.28)
ul
uc
=
AFl(l
∗,Kg)
(1 + τ)
(1.29)
(1 + τ)c∗ + T = h(A)F (l∗,Kg) (1.30)
When the country is in autarky, the government cannot issue sovereign bonds. The govern-
ment can only choose government consumption and government investment.
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For any debt recovery rate, the surplus for the country, ∆B, is defined by the difference
between the value of debt renegotiation, V D, and the value of financial autarky, V aut.
∆B(b,Kg, a) = V
D(b,Kg, a)− V aut(Kg, a) (1.31)
The surplus of the risk-neutral investor is recovered debt when recovery rates are rene-
gotiated.
∆L(b,Kg, a) = −αb (1.32)
Following Yue (2010), we assume that the country has a bargaining power θ and foreign
investors have a bargaining power 1−θ. Recovery rates are determined by the Nash bargain-
ing problem. The bargaining power parameter summarizes the institutional arrangement
of debt renegotiation. We define the bargaining power set Θ ⊂ [0, 1] such that the negoti-
ation surplus has a unique optimum for any asset position (bt), government capital (Kg,t),
and productivity state (at). Then recovery rates α(bt,Kg,t, at) ∈ A solves following Nash
bargaining problem, given the level of debt (b), government capital (Kg,t), and productivity
state (a).
α(b,Kg, a) = argmax
α
[((∆B(b,Kg, a))
θ(∆L(b,Kg, a))
1−θ] (1.33)
s.t. ∆B(b,Kg, a) > 0 (1.34)
∆L(b,Kg, a) > 0 (1.35)
Since the debt recovery schedule that maximizes the total renegotiation surplus depends
on the country’s debt level, the level of government capital, and productivity state, the
renegotiation provides better insurance to the country if it chooses to default.
1.4.5 Foreign Investor’s Problem
Foreign investors choose the next period’s debt level to maximize their profits pi, taking the
bond price function as given. Expected profits depend on the next period’s debt level, the
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next period’s government capital, and the current state of the economy given the current
productivity state. λ(b
′
,K
′
g, a) is the expected probability of default for a country given the
debt level (b
′
), government capital level (K
′
g), and productivity state (a).
Expected profits are, then, as follows:
E[pi(b
′
,K
′
g, a)] =
 q(b
′
,K
′
g, a)b
′ − 11+r b
′
if b
′ ≥ 0
[1−λ(b′ ,K′g ,a)+λ(b
′
,K
′
g ,a)α(b
′
,K
′
g ,a)]
1+r (−b
′
)− q(b′ ,K ′g, a)(−b
′
) if b
′
> 0
(1.36)
Since we assume completely competitive sovereign debt markets, risk-neutral foreign
investors get zero expected profit. The bond price is, then, given by
q(b
′
,K
′
g, a) =

1
1+r if b
′ ≥ 0
[1−λ(b′ ,K′g ,a)+λ(b
′
,K
′
g ,a)α(b
′
,K
′
g ,a)]
1+r if b
′
> 0
(1.37)
where λ reflects the default probability.
λ =
∫
D
dµ(a
′
, a), (1.38)
When the government lends to the foreign investors, b
′ ≥ 0, the government gets a risk-
free interest rate. When the government faces the possibility of default, foreign investors
have to consider two things. The first term, 1 − λ(b′ ,Kg ′ , a), compensates the foreign
investors for the risk of default. The second term λα(b
′
,Kg, a) represents the outcomes
of debt renegotiation. In this paper, we argue that the government capital Kg affects the
default risk and recovery rates, which previous papers have not considered.
1.4.6 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a stationary recursive equilibrium.
Definition 1.4.1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of value functions for (i) the country’s
value function V ∗(b,Kg, a), (ii) a set of policy functions for the government default decision
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set D∗(b,Kg), asset holdings b
′∗(b,Kg, a), government consumptions g∗(b,Kg, a), govern-
ment investment i∗(b,Kg, a), (iii) a set of policy functions for household’s consumption
c∗(b,Kg, a) and household’s labor supply l∗(b,Kg, a), (vi) bond price functions q∗(b
′
,K
′
g, a),
(v) recovery rate α∗(b,Kg, a)
such that
[1]. Given the bond price function q∗(b′ ,K ′g, a), debt recovery rates α∗(b,Kg, a), and
household consumption c∗(b,Kg, a) and labor supply decision l∗(b,Kg, a), the value func-
tion V ∗(b,Kg, a), asset positions b∗
′
(b,Kg, a), government consumption g
∗(b,Kg, a), and
government investment i∗(b,Kg, a), and default set satisfy the country’s optimization prob-
lem.
[2]. Given the government consumption g∗(b,Kg, a), government investment i∗(b,Kg, a)
and tax policies (τ, T ) and bond price function q∗(b′ ,K ′g, a), the household private consump-
tion c∗(b,Kg, a) and labor supply decision l∗(b,Kg, a) satisfy the household’s optimization
problem.
[3]. Given the bond price function q∗(b′ ,K ′g, a), the country’s value function V ∗(b,Kg, a),
the recovery rates α∗(b,Kg, a) solve the debt renegotiation problem.
[4]. Given the recovery rate α∗(b,Kg, a), the bond price function q∗(b
′
,K
′
g, a) satisfies
the zero expected profit function for foreign investors.
In equilibrium the default probability λ∗(b′ ,K ′g, a) is defined by using the country’s
default decision:
λ∗(b
′
,K
′
g, a) =
∫
D∗(b,Kg ,a)
dµ(a
′
, a), (1.39)
The expected recovery rate α∗(b,Kg, a) in equilibrium is given by
γ∗(b,Kg, a) =
∫
D∗(b,Kg ,a) α
∗(b,Kg, a)dµ(a
′
, a)∫
D∗(b,Kg ,a) dµ(a
′ , a)
=
∫
D∗(b,Kg ,a) α
∗(b,Kg, a)dµ(a
′
, a)
λ∗(b′ ,K ′g, a)
(1.40)
The numerator is the expected proportion of debt that the country pays to the foreign
investors and the denominator is the default probability.
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1.4.7 Characterization of Recursive Equilibrium
We now provide the main result of the model and characterize the equilibrium property.
For a bargaining power κ ∈ K, the equilibrium debt recovery function α∗(bt,Kg,t, at) is
increasing and concave with respect to the government capital (Kg,t), given asset holdings
(bt) and productivity shock (at).
This prediction implies that when the government has a high level of government capital,
exclusion from the international financial markets reduces the productivity of government
capital, therefore, it has more to lose by failing to reach debt renegotiation agreement.
However, the marginal increase of a debt renegotiation agreement surplus will diminish as
capital increases. The analytic expressions of equilibrium recovery rates are derived by
maximizing a joint surplus of the debt renegotiation agreement.
α∗(bt,Kg,t, at) = −1− θ
θ
V D − V aut
−bλ (1.41)
The Lagrangian multiplier λ is the shadow value of the government budget constraint
of (1.22) and depends on state variables. Therefore, the optimal recovery rates are a con-
stant fraction of the country’s leverage when debt renegotiation is resolved. For a given
level of debt and productivity, the relationship between optimal recovery rates and gov-
ernment capital depends on how the country’s surplus and shadow value change as capital
changes. Furthermore, we show in our calibration that as the government capital increases,
the shadow value decreases faster than the country’s surplus, therefore, the optimal recov-
ery rates increase. This compares with the corporate finance literature, where corporate
recovery rates are determined by the constant fraction of firm leverage. V D can be thought
of as a firm’s equity value and −bλ is the value of debt, when priced by the shadow value
of funds in the corporation.
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1.4.8 Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Policies
In this subsection, we present some fiscal rules and tax polices. First, fiscal rules restrict
the level of foreign debt by some exogenous debt limit.
bt+1 ≤ b¯ (1.42)
As for tax policies, we investigate how different tax policies affect the default incentives
without changing tax revenues. There are two kinds of tax policies: consumption tax τ and
lump-sum tax T . Consumption tax is distortionary in that it distorts labor supply decisions
and lump-sum tax is non-distortionary.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
This section provides calibrations, solves the model numerically, and analyzes the qualitative
and quantitative implications of the model.
1.5.1 Parameters and Functional Forms
We calibrate the parameters to match the business cycle, financial, and fiscal statistics
of Argentina. We define one period as a quarter. We use the Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Huffman (GHH) utility to exclude the wealth effect on labor supply. This utility is
commonly used in open macroeconomics following Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003).
u(ct, gt, 1− lt) = (1− λ)
(ct − l
1+ψ
t
1+ψ )
1−γ
1− γ + λ
g1−γt
1− γ (1.43)
Private consumption and labor supply decisions are separable as GHH (1998). As
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), government consumption and private sector vari-
ables are separable in per-period utility specification. The risk aversion parameter γ is
equal to 2, following standard RBC literature. The labor elasticity is chosen to be 1ψ = 2.22
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following Mendoza (1991) and Cuadra et al. (2010). The parameter λ = 0.3 is set to match
the ratio of public consumption to output equal to 20%.
The productivity process is calibrated to match the Argentina quarterly real GDP for
1980Q1 TO 2003Q3 from the Ministry of Finance of Argentina (MECON). We assume that
the productivity process follows the lognormal AR(1) process:
ln(At) = ρ ln(At−1) + t (1.44)
with E() = 0 and E(2) = σ2 .
The quarterly series data are detrended by using Hodrick-Prescott filter of 1600. The
parameters ρ = 0.9 and  = 0.01 are obtained. We approximate this stochastic process
as discrete Markov chains of 21 equally spaced grids by using the quadrature method of
Tauchen and Hussey (1991). The risk-free rate r is set to equal to 0.01, which matches
with average quarterly real interest rate on 3-month U.S. Treasury bills. The bargaining
power κ=0.7 is calibrated to match the recovery rates of 30 % for Argentina during 2005
international debt restructuring. The cost of default is specified following Arellano (2008).
Asymmetric functional form indicates that output cost is more severe when the economy
is hit by good shock whereas the cost of default is not as severe when the economy is in a
bad state. This is an important component in Arellano (2008) in deriving a counter-cyclical
interest rate, which is commonly found in emerging economies. The default penalty φ is set
to 0.96.
h(At) =
 φE(A) if A > φE(A)A if A ≤ φE(A) (1.45)
The set of parameter {β, Ω} are jointly calibrated to match the default frequency and
the government investment to output ratio.
The discount factor β and adjustment cost parameter Ω are calibrated to be 0.85 and
20, respectively.17 Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt five times between 1824 and
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2001. A default frequency of 3% can be rationalized on this ground.18 The adjustment cost
parameter is somewhat large in our calibration Ω = 20. However, this large adjustment cost
is needed to achieve a reasonable investment ratio. The government capital depreciation is
set to be at δ = 0.05 The elasticity of public investment θ is set to 0.034, following Azzimonti
(2013).19 The consumption tax τ and the lump-sum tax T are jointly calibrated to match
tax revenue and consumption to output ratio in the Argentina economy. Tax revenue in
Argentina is approximated as 15-20% of GDP. The consumption to output volatility ratio
is 1.03%
17The discount factor in the sovereign default literature ranges from 0.6 to 0.97. A low discount factor
reflects the myopic behavior of the government which stems from instability of political environment
18See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
19Baxter and King (1993) included military spending and get 0.05
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Parameter Value Sources
Risk aversion γ = 2 RBC Literature
Labor elasticity 1/ψ = 2.22 Mendoza (1991)
Risk free rate r = 0.01 U.S. quarterly interest rate
Productivity persistence ρ = 0.95 Argentina, 1980Q1-2002Q4
Standard deviation σ = 0.01 Argentina, 1980Q1-2002Q4
Gov’t consumption weight λ = 0.3 Gov’con/GDP 20%
Public capital share of income θ = 0.034 Azzimonti (2013)
Public capital depreciation δ = 0.05 Gordon and Guerron-Quintana (2013)
Bargaining power κ = 0.7 recovery rate 40%
Default penalty φ = 0.96 Arellano (2008)
Adjustment cost Ω = 20 Gov investment/GDP 2%
Discount factor β = 0.85 default frequency 4%(Annual)
Consumption tax τc = 0.30 tax revenue=18%
Lump-sum tax T = 0.02 σ(c)/σ(y) = 1.03
Table 1.1: Model Parameters
1.6 Model Implication
In this section, we study the equilibrium properties of the calibrated model. Then, we
investigate the simulation results.
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Figure 1.2: Recovery rates, debt holdings, and productivity states
Figure 1.2 presents the equilibrium debt recovery rates schedule. As shown in Yue
(2010), figure 1.2 presents the relationship between recovery rates and debt holdings for
three states of the economy. It is clear from the figure that when the amount of defaulted
debt is high, the recovery rates tend to be small. As the amount of defaulted debt decreases,
the debt reduction decreases and reaches a threshold beyond which there is no further
debt reduction. In addition, the figure shows that debt recovery rates are high when the
government defaults with a good productivity shock. This implies that if the country’s
economic situation is relatively good when the country defaults on its debt and would likely
improve in the future, debt renegotiation is resolved with low debt reduction and the country
can re-access the international financial market immediately after.20 The debt reduction
threshold also increases as the country’s productivity improves.
20Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007) study a mechanism that monopolistic lenders find it profitable to let the
borrower to access the international credit market after a sequence of good shocks. Benjamin and Wright
(2008) provide an empirical relationship that recovery rates tend to be high with good state of the country.
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Figure 1.3: Recover rates and government capital
The new feature in this paper is figure 1.3. Figure 1.3 provides the relationship between
the level of government capital and recovery rates. The more government capital the country
has, the higher the recovery rates tend to be renegotiated during the debt restructuring
process. This increase in recovery rates, however, tends to diminish as more government
capital is accumulated. When the level of government capital is low, there is not much to
lose by not re-accessing the international financial market. Therefore, the government does
not need to pay much to re-access the international financial markets. However, as the
government capital increases, the benefits of rejoining the international financial markets
increase sharply. The marginal increase in surplus, however, slows down as government
capital is accumulated. Figure 1.4 shows the joint surplus of debt renegotiation agreement.
The optimal recovery rates that maximize the joint surplus increase in a concave manner
when the level of government capital increases.
Figure 1.5 plots the default probability as a function of debt holdings for good, average,
and bad states of productivity, given a median level of public capital.
The probability of default increases as the level of debt increases. For a high level of
debt, it is optimal for the government to default regardless of its economic states since the
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Figure 1.4: Joint surplus and optimal recovery rates
Figure 1.5: Default probability and productivity states
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Figure 1.6: Default probability and government capital
cost of repaying its debt is high. On the other hand, the government has no incentive to
default when the level of debt is low. In the mid range, however, the government may default
or not, depending on the productivity states. The higher the country is in a productivity
state, the lower the government’s incentive to default.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the default probability for different levels of government capital.
It is obvious from the figure that high government capital reduces the government’s default
probability.
Figure 1.7 provides the default/repayment regions in productivity states and debt spaces,
(a, b), for high and low levels of government capital. The boundary between default and
repayment regions has negative slope in (a, b) space. The lower line represents high govern-
ment capital and the upper line is for low government capital. The lower-left region shows
the default region while the upper-right region indicates the repayment region for both levels
of government capital. This implies that as foreign borrowing increases, default incentive
increases for a given level of productivity state. Likewise, the default incentive increases
when the economic states deteriorate. What is interesting in this feature is that as govern-
ment capital increases, the default region shrinks. This fact underscores the importance of
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Figure 1.7: Default set in productivity and asset space
government capital as a tool to adjust in response to shocks.
Figure 1.8 presents the bond price functions with three different productivity levels in
the current period. It shows that the bond price increase with productivity. Low default
probabilities and high recovery rates generate high bond prices. Figure 1.9 shows that the
bond price functions increases with government capital when the country is in a median
productivity state. It is interesting to note that the increase in the bond price is particularly
marked when government capital is low. The reason is that as government capital increases,
the equilibrium recovery rates increase sharply at a low level of government capital but
slowly at a high level of government capital.
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Figure 1.8: Bond price and productivity state
Figure 1.9: Bond price and government capital
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1.6.1 Simulation Results
We conduct 1000 rounds of simulations, with 300 periods for each round. Then, we extract
the last 100 periods to investigate business cycles, financial, and fiscal features in the sta-
tionary distribution of the model. The simulated series are logged and filtered. Our results
are presented in table 1.2.
The model matches the business cycle statistics. The model generates the high volatility
of private consumption relative to the volatility of output.21 Since the country is not allowed
to borrow in bad times, the volatility of consumption behaves very similarly with the output
process. The ratio of private consumption volatility to output volatility is 1.03% in our
calibrated model just as data. The trade balance volatility of 1.69% is somewhat lower than
the data of 2.75%. The correlation between the trade balance and output is counter-cyclical
as the data indicates, but small in magnitude. When a negative productivity shock hits the
economy, the government can sustain government consumption by adjusting government
capital and relying less on foreign debt. Therefore, the cost of credit does not increase
severely, and the government can still access the international financial markets.
One of the interesting findings of the paper is that a high debt to output ratio is possible
with a reasonable default frequency when we introduce government capital and an endoge-
nous debt renegotiation process without explicitly targeting this ratio in the calibration
process. We generate a debt to output ratio around 20% with an annual default frequency
around 4%. The debt to output ratio is relatively small compared with an average external
debt to output ratio of 46.5% from 1980 to 2002 in Argentina. However, our results improve
on previous papers in matching the ratio and we provide a complementary mechanism.22
The mechanism behind this result is that it is costly for the country to remain in financial
autarky if it has a high level of government capital. The defaulting country must, then,
21Emerging economy is characterized by high volatile private consumption whereas advanced economy has
less volatile consumption process. See Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
22Arellano (2008) generates a debt to output ratio of 5.95%. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) get relatively
high debt to output ratio of 19% but with very low default frequency, 0.92%. Yue (2010) succeeds in
improving the ratio to 10.13% by introducing endogenous debt renegotiation processes.
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pay a high cost to re-access the international financial markets, (i.e high recovery rates).
This implies that there is not much to gain by defaulting because of the output cost during
default as well as the high recovery rates during the renegotiation process. This reduces
the risk of sovereign debt default, thereby lowering interest rates. Then the country has
room to increase government investment and accumulate government capital further. This
generates an amplification mechanism, making sovereign bonds safer. The country can,
then, take more debt from foreign investors by the general equilibrium effects.
The model generates reasonable financial statistics from the calibrated model. The
sovereign bond spreads in the model are counter-cyclical in that the sovereign spread and
output are negatively correlated (-0.1%). This implies that when the country is hit by nega-
tive productivity shocks, default risk increases and the recovery rate decreases. However, a
negative productivity shock also implies a low rate of return on government capital. Hence,
interest rates do not increase enough to exhibit high counter-cyclical spreads, -0.43, as in
the data. The annual average sovereign spread in the model is around 5.2% with default
frequency around 4.5%. The volatility of the spread is 8.5%. This value is large compared
with 2.67% in the data. The endogenous debt recovery rates break the strict relationship
between default probability and bonds price.
We are modestly successful in matching the level of fiscal statistics. The government
consumption volatility is high compared with the output volatility. The volatility ratio is
around 1.2. The correlation of government consumption and output is 0.82 in our simula-
tions, similar to the data of 0.78. Other papers such as Cuadra, Sanchez and Sapriza (2010)
for Mexico generate a high correlation. The government consumption to output ratio is
around 23%, a little higher than 16% in the data. The government investment ratio to
output of 1.4% is similar to the data of 2.0%.
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Data Model A&G (2006) Arellano (2008) Yue (2010)
σ(C)/σ(GDP ) 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.10 1.04
σ(TB)/σ(GDP ) 2.75 1.69 0.95 1.50 2.81
ρ(GDP, TB/GDP ) -0.39 -0.01 -0.19 -0.25 -0.16
Debt/Output ratio 46.5 20 19 5.95 10.13
ρ(GDP,Spread) -0.43 -0.1 -0.03 -0.29 -0.11
E(spread) 7.17 5.2 0.92 3.58 1.86
σ(spread) 2.67 8.5 0.32 6.36 1.58
Default frequency(%) 2.7 4.5 0.92 3 2.7
Average recovery rate(%) 27 40 - - 27.31
σ(G)/σ(GDP ) 1.7 1.18 - - -
ρ(GDP,G) 0.78 0.79 - - -
G/GDP 15-20 23.5 - - -
Kg/GDP 30 28 - - -
i/GDP 2.0 1.4 - - -
Table 1.2: Model statistics for Argentina
1.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the model.
First, we investigate how government shortsightedness affects fiscal and business cycle statis-
tics.
Since the discount factor, β, governs the patience of the government, it is interesting
to see how government myopia affects government capital accumulation and its subsequent
effects on default incentives. It is well known that political uncertainty or instability is
one of the important factors in government capital accumulation.23 Myopic governments
prefer current consumption to future consumption. In the context of our paper, this implies
that the government is more likely to choose government consumption rather than gov-
ernment investment. Particularly, when negative productivity shocks hit the economy, the
government’s debt consolidation strategy tends to focus on cutting productive government
investment, and securing unproductive current government consumption. In our model, this
23Azzimonti (2013) shows that political turnover between two parties who have a different degree of
short-sightedness can generate systematic underinvestment in public investment and overspending on non-
productive government spending.
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β = 0.8 β = 0.85 β = 0.9
G/GDP 27 26 25
Kg/GDP 26 28 31
i/GDP 1.3 1.4 1.56
i/G 4.8 5.4 6.2
Tax Revenue 17 18 19.5
Default probability 7 4.5 3.5
Table 1.3: Sensitivity analysis of government shortsightedness
translates into a low level of government capital accumulation. This generates low output
and reduces tax revenues in the long run.
Table 1.3 shows these arguments. β = 0.8 and β = 0.9 represent myopic and patient
society, respectively. When β increases, the government consumption to output ratio de-
creases. However, government investment increases as the patient government cares more
about future consumption than the myopic government, from 1.3% to 1.56% of total output.
The government investment to government consumption ratio increases as the β increases.
Furthermore, since government investment is one of the components in the production func-
tion, the increase in government investment results in an increase of tax revenue in the long
run, as shown in the table. The default probability of the government is therefore reduced.
The sensitivity analysis implies that the endogenous default risk and the government
capital accumulation can generate a negative amplification mechanism, similar to Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1998). Therefore, emerging or
developing countries that tend to be myopic can be more vulnerable to negative productivity
shocks.
1.7 Fiscal rule and fiscal austerity
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal austerity policies that increase taxes
and a fiscal rule that limits the level of foreign debt in the model.
Table 1.4 presents the long run average statistics of three policy experiments. When
the government increases a distortionary consumption tax rate from 0.3 to 0.4, tax revenue
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Benchmark High τ High T Debt Ceiling
τ = 0.3, T = 0.02 τ = 0.4 T=0.04 b=0.1
GDP 0.74 0.67 0.79 0.73
G/GDP 23.5 28.5 25 23.7
Kg/GDP 28 36 32 27
i/GDP 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.35
Debt/GDP 20 27 27 13
Tax Revenue 24 30.5 26.9 25.2
E(spread) 5.2 5.22 3.5 0.3
Default prob 4.5 4.6 3.0 0.28
Table 1.4: Fiscal policies
increases in this economy. This implies that the country lies on the left side of the Laffer
curve. With the high government revenue, the government can increase government spend-
ing on both government consumption and government investment. With a more relaxed
government budget constraint, the default incentive of the government decreases, given the
productivity shock. This generates a higher debt to output ratio around 27%, compared
with 20% of the benchmark economy with the similar default probability. If the government
implements a non-distortionary lump-sum tax from 0.02 to 0.04, tax revenues also increases.
Government consumption to output ratio and government capital to output ratio de-
crease compared with consumption tax policy. However, the decrease of the ratio is caused
not by the decreases in government spending but by the output increases. Furthermore,
the default probability is reduced to around 3%.
Next, the debt ceiling fiscal rule prevents the country from borrowing more than the
specified exogenous level of debt. The debt to output ratio, then, decreases severely from
20 to 13. The default probability also decreases substantially. The government spending
is the same as the benchmark model. This policy experiment implies that a fiscal rule can
help the government to maintain a manageable level of debt and reduce the risk of default
without hurting government capital accumulation.
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1.8 Conclusion
Emerging economies or developing countries sometimes experience severe sovereign debt
crises followed by drops in output and consumption and exclusion from the international
financial markets. Even advanced countries can suffer sovereign debt crises as the recent
European debt crises show. Therefore, it is important to understand why the government
defaults and how the debt restructuring renegotiation resolutions are reached in sovereign
debt markets. In this paper, we particularly pay attention to the role of government capital
in the default incentive and market re-access incentive. We find that government capital
plays a significant role during sovereign debt crises when the government has a limited
ability to extract tax revenues from the private sector. When the government defaults on
its debt, endogenous recovery rates tend to be high if the government has a high level of
government capital. The high debt recovery rates make the government less likely to default
in the ex-ante, reducing default risks even further. The low level of default risk and the
debt renegotiation insurance enable the government to raise more credits from the inter-
national financial markets. Thus, the introduction of government capital and endogenous
debt renegotiation generate reasonable business cycle features, including a reasonable debt
to output ratio. In this sense, we provide another mechanism for sustaining high debt to
output ratios.
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Chapter 2
Can News Shock Help to Explain Differences in
Fiscal Policy Cyclicality Between Developing and
Developed Countries?
2.1 Introduction
Emerging countries or developing countries tend to exhibit procyclical fiscal policy: gov-
ernment expenditures tend to rise and tax policy tends to fall when the economy expands,
while the government expenditures tend to fall and tax policy tends to rise when the econ-
omy recedes. Developed countries tend to have acyclical or countercyclical fiscal policy in
that government expenditures and tax policies do not align with or counter the economic
output process.1 Procyclical fiscal policy is not desirable in the eyes of academics and policy
makers because government expenditures are most needed when the economy is in reces-
sion. Furthermore, procyclical fiscal policy exacerbates the business cycle, making output
and consumption more volatile and reducing welfare in the economy.
Another interesting feature between developing and developed countries is a difference in
the precision of news about future fundamentals. Developed countries have more accurate
and higher quality data that can be used to forecast future economic fundamentals. Fur-
thermore, more transparent macroeconomic policy, data availability, and accounting devices
1Following Kaminsky et al. (2004), we define fiscal policy cyclicality as following: countercyclical fiscal
policy involves lower (higher) government spending and higher (lower) tax rates in good (bad) times whereas
procyclical fiscal policy involves higher (lower) government spending and lower (higher) tax rates in good
(bad) times. Acyclical fiscal policy involves contant government spending and constant tax rates over
business cycles.
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help to protect investors from abrupt changes in economic situations. On the other hand,
lack of credible data and less transparent statistics in developing countries make it hard for
investors to forecast future fundamentals.2 Thus, it is possible that investors demand an
additional risk premium to hold government debt.
The objective of this paper is to provide an explanation that can account for the differ-
ence in fiscal policy dynamics between developing and developed countries by introducing
news related shock and endogenous fiscal policy in the small open economy model in spirit
of Arellano (2008). Recently, the changes in expectations about future fundamentals -
due to news announcement or news- have been recognized as one of the driving forces in
the deepening European sovereign debt crisis: the pessimistic forecasts from credit rat-
ings announcements, international organizations, and the private sectors caught the eyes
of investors in the sovereign debt markets, driving the sovereign default risk high enough
to deter capital inflow.3 Lack of foreign borrowing makes fiscal austerity more severe and
therefore a debt crisis is more likely to lead to default. Greece actually defaulted in 2012
in the midst of pessimistic economic outlooks for future growth rates and public finances.4
In this sense, it is important to see the effect of changing expectations or news about fu-
ture fundamentals on sovereign default risk and its interconnection with fiscal policy. We
investigate this possibility with a standard sovereign debt default framework.
The key intuition is that more precise information about future fundamentals makes it
easier for agents to prepare for the possible negative shocks. Households and the government
can smooth consumption streams over the period. Foreign investors can also accurately pre-
dict the future fundamentals and prepare for a default possibility more effectively. Moreover,
2Boz et al (2011), Gelos and Wei (2005) show that high income countries are more closely monitored, have
better quality and transparent macroeconomic data. Frankel et al. (2013) emphasize the role of institutional
quality on fiscal policy cyclicality. Among the institutional qaulity, the role of independent forecast council
is crucial in escaping from procyclical fiscal policy.
3For instance: Poul Thomsen, deputy director of the IMF’s European department and its mission chief to
Greece, said: ”We have revised growth down significantly to -6% in 2011 and -3% in 2012. We expected 2011
to be an inflection point when the recession bottomed out, followed by a slow recovery. But the economy
is continuing to trend downwards. The hoped for improvement in market sentiment and in the investment
climate has not materialised.” (The guardian December 13, 2011)
4Greece defaulted its sovereign debt in 2012. Around 200 billion dollars debt exchanged and buyback.
The haircut is around 65%. See Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
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even when the government declares default, foreign investors can expect to get high debt
recovery rates for any given amount of debt. As a result, the risk premium required for
foreign investors to hold risky government debt decreases with more precise information
about the future fundamentals. This means that the government can rely more on foreign
borrowing and less on tax revenues conditional on not defaulting. Then tax rates are lower
in countries with more precise news about future fundamentals. Moreover, low tax rates
increases output since tax policy is distortionary and households supply less labor to pro-
duce goods. This amplification mechanism caused by endogenous tax policy decreases the
risk of default further, making more room for foreign borrowing, which in turn dampens
the correlations of tax rates and government spending.
We calibrate the baseline model of no news case with the empirical regularities of Ar-
gentina. Argentina’s experience is an ideal case study because it exhibited high procyclical
fiscal policy and volatile default risk during 1990s, leading to a severe sovereign debt crisis
in 2001. Moreover, the degree of news precision is low compared with developed countries.
We assume that news in the developed country is highly informative in the model. We,
then, vary the parameter which controls the precision of information content to see whether
high news precision can create fiscal policy and business cycle statistics closer to that of
developed countries.
We find out that news-related shocks can push the correlation between output and gov-
ernment expenditure in the right direction. Without news shocks, the correlation between
output and government expenditure is 0.93, which means that they are highly correlated
with each other. However, as we increase the news precision, the correlation of government
expenditure with output decreases monotonically down to 0.75. This is still high compared
with the data, but it is moving in the right direction.5 The tax policy cyclicality in the sim-
ulation also delivers more realistic differences between developing and developed countries.
As documented by Vegh and Vuletin (2012), developed countries tend to have an acyclical
5Iletzki (2010) decomposes government expenditure into government consumption and transfer to gener-
ate low correlation of government expenditure with output in a political friction economy.
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tax policy while developing countries tend to have a procyclical tax policy. In the no news
economy, the cyclicality of tax policy with output is -0.47. However, as we move towards a
very accurate news economy, the correlation is -0.19.
As for the business cycle, we can match the difference in fluctuations in real variables
between developing and developed countries. In our model, sovereign default risk and bond
spreads are lower and recovery rates are higher in an economy with more precise informa-
tion for a given level of current debt holding. This enables the government to accumulate a
high debt level. Debt to output ratio varies from 10% to 12.6% as we increase the precision
of news. The cyclicality of the trade balance also falls from -0.46 to -0.18 as the precision
of news improves. This implies that there is more room for foreign borrowing when the
country is hit by a negative productivity in a precise economy. Private consumption and
government spending volatility are reduced as a government effectively smoothes consump-
tion streams because they can more accurately anticipate future fundamentals. Output
volatility also decreases because the resulting low correlation between the (distortionary)
tax rate and output makes the household’s labor supply decisions less volatile, contributing
to less volatility of output.
Our paper is most closely related to Durdu, Nunes, Sapriza (2013) in that we investigate
the role of news precision on business cycles features between developing and developed
economies. They show that more precise news can generate lower volatility in private
consumption and lower cyclicality in the trade balance. We differ with their paper since we
study fiscal policy dynamics as well as business cycle features. Since we deliver endogenous
fiscal policy in the model, we can investigate the effect of news shock on tax policy and the
feedback effect of tax policy on business cycle variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related literature.
Section 2.3 presents empirical evidence of fiscal policy dynamics and news shock. Section 2.4
provides a theoretical model. Section 2.5 defines recursive equilibrium. The calibration and
quantitative implications will be discussed in section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides conclusions.
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2.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the emerging market fiscal policy literature. Kaminsky, Reinhart,
and Vegh (2004) document that fiscal policy is procyclical for the majority of developing
countries. As for tax policy, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) provide evidence that tax policy is
acyclical in industrial countries but mostly procyclical in developing countries. One strand
of literature studies a political economy explanation. Alesina et al. (2008) develop a political
agency model to investigate the conflict between governments and voters over political rents
which leads to procyclical fiscal policy. Ilzetzki (2011) explores a dynamic political model
to show that successive governments which disagree on the desired distribution of public
spending can generate procyclical fiscal policies. Frankel et al. (2013) focus on the quality of
institutions and show that strong institutions can cause smaller procyclical fiscal policies.6
The other strand of literature focuses on fiscal policy in an endogenous sovereign default
model by looking at the importance of incomplete markets in international financial markets.
Following Arellano (2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)7, Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza
(2010) combine endogenous fiscal policy with endogenous sovereign default risk. The risk
of default in recession increases the cost of foreign credit and makes governments rely more
heavily on tax policy. Pouzo and Presno (2014) study the possibility of sovereign default
affecting tax policy and bond prices. The high risk of default generates a lower level of debt
and high volatile tax revenues in emerging economies. Hatchondo, Martinez, and Roch
(2013) implement a fiscal rule which prevents high debt levels and find out that a fiscal
rule can generate a less procyclical fiscal policy. Tsyrennikov (2014) introduces pessimism
coming from model misspecification. In this environment, the government manages the
adverse state by implementing countercyclical fiscal policy.8 What is distinctive in our
6See also Woo (2009), Azzimonti (2013), and Talvi and Vegh (2005) for political economy explanation.
7Quantitative sovereign default literature: Amador (2003), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Hatchondo, Mar-
tinez, and Sapriza (2009), Borri and Verdelhan (2011), Lizarazo (2005), Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajsek (2013),
Mendoza and Yue (2012), Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009), Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012)
8Several papers investigate the role of incomplete market on fiscal policy. Gavin and Perotti (1997),
Aizenman et al. (2000), Riascos and Vegh (2003), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), Parmasiz (2010), Doda
(2007), Suzuki (2010), Froemel (2014)
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paper is that we introduce news-related shocks, which are unrelated to contemporaneous
TFP to explain the cyclicality of fiscal policy.
Lastly, we adapt the information structure from the news shock literature. Beaudry and
Portier (2006) explore news about future technology opportunities which is captured in stock
prices and can explain booms in consumption, investment and hours worked. Jaimovich and
Rebelo (2008, 2009) propose several mechanisms to explain the comovement among business
cycles variables caused by news driven shocks in closed and open economies. Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2012), Boz, Durdu, and Daude (2011) explore the learning process between
permanent and transitory shocks and find out that severe informational frictions can account
for high volatility of private consumption relative to output and a strong countercyclicality
trade balance in emerging market economies. Our paper differs from this literature in that
we concentrate on fiscal policy dynamics based on news precision or forecasting precision.
2.3 Stylized Facts
In this section, we show that fiscal policy cyclicality is related with precision of news about
future economic growth rates.
2.3.1 Fiscal Policy and News Precision
In this section, we document the relationship between fiscal policy cyclicality and precision
of news for each country.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between income levels and the degree of news precision.
Following Durdu et al. (2013), we use forecast errors as a measure of news precision. By
using Consensus Forecast’s one quarter ahead forecast errors for quarterly GDP growth, we
get forecast errors using Theil (1961) U indicator.
Ui =
√
1
N
∑
(ei,t − e¯)2
1
N
∑
(yi,t − y¯)2
(2.1)
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Figure 2.1: Income Level and Forecast Error, Source: Durdu et al. (2013)
The more precise the news, the closer Theil’s index comes to 0. Therefore, the figure 2.2
shows that the degree of news precision about GDP growth is more accurate in developed
countries than developing countries.
Based on the index of news precision, we provide the relationship between cyclicality of
government expenditure and news precision about the future GDP growth.
The root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of Consensus Forecasts’ one quarter ahead forecast
errors, (yt+1−Etyt+1), for quarterly GDP growth (at annualized rates) for a set of developed
and emerging market countries. RMSE is a numerator in Theill’s U index. The diamond
indicates the developing countries and the square represents the developed countries.
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 show that the more precise the news, the less fiscal policy is correlated
with output. Moreover, the developing countries tend to exhibit procyclical fiscal policy.
2.3.2 General Points
The model considers sovereign default and fiscal policy in a stochastic dynamic small open
economy model. There are three agents in our economy: a risk averse household, a risk
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Figure 2.2: Cyclicality of government expenditures and forecast errors. HP filtered cyclicality com-
ponents of total real central government expenditures and Root of Mean Square Error, using data set
from Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013, JDE) and Durda, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013, JIE)
Figure 2.3: Cyclicality of government expenditures and forecast errors. HP filtered cyclicality com-
ponents of total real central government expenditures and Root of Mean Square Error, using data set
from Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013, JDE) and Durda, Nunes, and Sapriza (2013, JIE)
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averse government, and a risk neutral foreign investor.
First, we assume that the household’s preference is defined by the following utility
function.
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, 1− lt, gt) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(u(ct, 1− lt) + v(gt)) (2.2)
where 0 < β < 0 is a discount factor, ct denotes private consumption, lt is the labor supply,
gt is government consumption in period t. u(ct, 1− lt) and v(gt) are one period private and
public utility functions, which is strictly concave, continuous, and differentiable.
The country receives two shocks: Total factor productivity (TFP) shock and signals
about the future TFP. The TFP shock is drawn from a compact set of A = [amin, amax] ⊂
R+. We assume a simple AR(1) TFP process as following:
ln(At) = ρ ln(At−1) + t (2.3)
with E() = 0 and E(2) = σ2 . The process is approximated using a discrete one-period
Markov chain with probability distribution, µ(at+1|at). Now we characterize the information
structure regarding future TFP states of the economy. Following Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2008) and Durdu et al (2013), we introduce the signal (st) regarding future TFP state
(at). Denoting the probability space of TPF as Θ and signal space as Ξ, we assume that
the probability space of TFP and the signal coincides. i.e Θ=Ξ. The precision of the signal
regarding future TFP can be summarized by the following equation.
p(st = i | zt+1 = l) =
 η if i = l1−η|Ξ|−1 if i 6= l (2.4)
This probability function implies that the probability of a correct signal is observed
regarding future TFP states are given by η and the probabilities of incorrect signals are
equally assigned. The higher the η is assigned, the more precise the current signals about
future states of the economy. We vary the value of η from η= 1|Ξ| to 1. When η=
1
|Ξ| , then
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signal (st) do not contain any information about future TFP whereas if η=1, then signal
(st) perfectly predicts future TFP states. Following this Bayesian updating, we can forecast
future TFP states at+1 given current signal st and current TFP state at.
p(at+1 = l | st = i, at = j) = p(st = i | at+1 = j)p(at+1 = l | at = j)∑
n p(st = i | at+1 = n)p(at+1 = n | at = j)
(2.5)
The joint evolution of TFP shock and the signal can be expressed in the following Markov
chain:
Π(z
′
, s
′ | z, s) = p(st+1 = κ, zt+1 = l | st = i, zt = j)
=p(zt+1 = l | st = i, zt = j)
∑
m[p(zt+2 = m | zt+1 = l)p(st+1 = κ | zt+2 = m)], (2.6)
The international capital markets are incomplete. The government and foreign investors
can borrow and lend only via one-period zero-coupon bonds, where bt+1 denotes the amount
of bonds to be repaid next period. When the government purchases bonds, bt+1 > 0, and
when it issues new bonds, bt+1 < 0. The set of the amount of bonds is B = [bmin, bmax] ⊂ R,
where bmin ≤ 0 ≤ bmax. The upper bound is the highest level of assets that the government
can accumulate and the lower bound is the highest level of debts that the government can
hold. We assume q(bt+1, at, st) is the bond price with asset position (bt+1),TFP shock (at),
and signal (st). The bond price will be determined in equilibrium.
We assume that foreign investors always commit to repay their debt. However, the
government is free to decide whether to repay its debt or to default. If the government
chooses to repay its debt, it will preserve access to international capital markets next period.
If the government chooses not to pay its debt, it is subject to both exclusion at that
period from the international capital markets and direct productivity cost. However, the
government and the foreign creditor renegotiate for recovery rates.
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Figure 2.4: Timing of the model
2.3.3 Timing of the model
Timing of decisions is summarized in Figure 2.5.
1. Period t starts. TFP shock (at) and signal (st) for one period ahead TFP shock are
observed.
2. Given that the country is not excluded from the international credit markets, the
government enters the period with a level of sovereign debt (bt). The pay-off relevant
state variables are the level of debt, the TFP shock, and the signal for future TFP:
(bt, at, st)
3. The government makes a default decision : dt ∈ {0, 1}
(a) If it chooses to repay,
i. Household makes private consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt) decisions for
given government policies of government consumption (gt) and tax policies
(τ).
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ii. The firm maximizes profits
iii. The government chooses new borrowing (bt+1), government consumption
(gt), and tax rates policy (τt), given optimal private sector’s decisions.
iv. The default probability and bond price are determined in equilibrium and
the foreign investor issue (bt+1) with this belief.
(b) If the government chooses to default, the country is excluded from the interna-
tional credit markets and suffer productivity loss (h(A))
i. Household makes consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt) decisions for given
current government policies of government consumption (gt) and tax policies
(τ)
ii. Firm maximizes profit maximization.
iii. The government chooses government consumption (gt) and tax rate policy
(τt) given the optimal private sector’s decisions.
iv. At the end of period t, the government and the foreign investor renegotiate
for the recovery rates (αt), the government repays the renegotiated debt to
the creditor and can access the international financial markets next period.
2.3.4 Household’s problem
The representative household chooses consumption (ct) and labor supply (lt) to maximize
expected lifetime utility, given current government polices (gt, τ , T ).
max
ct,lt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct, gt, 1− lt) , (2.7)
s.t. (1 + τt)ct = wtlt (2.8)
The per-period utility function is concave, strictly increasing, and twice differentiable.
The household earns an income from supplying labor to firms. The discount factor is β ∈
(0, 1) and the household gets utility from private consumption, government consumption,
and leisure.
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The private component and public component are separable in the utility function with
weight λ on government consumption.
U(ct, gt, 1− lt) = (1− λ)u(ct, lt) + λv(gt) (2.9)
We assume Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (GHH) per-period utility function to
exclude the effect of wealth on labor supply decision. We will provide a more detailed
specification in the calibration section. The household’s problem in this setting is static in
that the household is not allowed to access the international financial markets to smooth
consumption. The household provides labor supply, given consumption tax rates.
The household’s first order condition is
ul
uc
= (
w
1 + τ
) (2.10)
Applying GHH utility specification assumption, we get
lt = (
w
1 + τ
)
1
ψ (2.11)
As seen in the optimality conditions, the labor supply decision depends on the consump-
tion tax τ . A high consumption tax rate induces less labor supply and, therefore, lower
output.
2.3.5 Firm’s Problem
Final goods production is subject to productivity shocks At. Labor supply from household
is the only input in this economy. Output is divided between private consumption and
public consumption. Production technology follows the Cobb-Douglas form.
AtF (lt) = Atlt. (2.12)
Given this production function, a firm’s profit maximization problem is
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max
lt
Πt = AtF (lt)− wtlt (2.13)
2.3.6 Government Decision
The government’s problem is to maximize the households’ expected lifetime utility. The
government makes a default decision and determines asset positions for the next period
(bt+1), government consumption (gt), and tax rates (τt), given its current asset position
(bt), TFP shock (at), and news (or signal) (st) for one period ahead TFP states, and
the household’s optimal decision. The value function of the government is denoted by
V (bt, at, st).
For bt > 0, the government has savings. The government receives payment from foreign
investors and determines its next period’s bond holdings (bt+1), government consumption
(gt), and tax rates (τt). The value functions is
V (b, a, s) = max
g,b′ ,τ
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (b
′
, a
′
, s
′
)dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s) (2.14)
s.t. g = τc+ b− q(b′ , a)b′ (2.15)
ul
uc
=
AFl(l
∗)
(1 + τ)
(2.16)
c∗ =
AF (l∗)
(1 + τ)
(2.17)
Equation 2.15 is the government budget constraint. Government expenditure (g) is fi-
nanced by consumption tax revenues (τc) and foreign borrowings (b−q(b′(b′ , a, s)b′). Equa-
tion 2.16 refers to the household’s optimal labor supply decisions. The resource constraint
is given by equation 2.17.
For bt < 0, the government has debt. The country has the option to default on its
debt. If the government decides to pay its debt, it chooses its next-period asset position
bt+1, government consumption (gt), and tax rates (τt). If it chooses to default, it will be
excluded from international financial markets and the government chooses only government
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consumption (gt) and consumption tax rate (τt).
Given the option to default, V (bt, at, st) satisfies
V (bt, at, st) = max
[
V R(bt, at, st), V
D(bt, at, st)
]
(2.18)
where V R(bt, at, st) is the value associated with paying debt and V
D(bt, at, , st) is the value
with defaulting debt.
The optimal default decision of the government, then, is characterized by:
D(bt) =
{
(at, st) ∈ Λ : V R(bt, at, st) < V D (at, st)
}
(2.19)
The default set is the set of TFP and signals such that the value of default is higher
than the value of repayment given the current debt holdings.
The value of repayment , V R, is as following:
V R(bt, at, st) = max
g,b′ ,τ
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (b
′
, a
′
, s
′
)dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s) (2.20)
s.t. g = τc+ b− q(b′ , a)b′ (2.21)
ul
uc
=
AFl(l
∗)
(1 + τ)
(2.22)
c∗ =
AF (l∗)
(1 + τ)
(2.23)
V D(at, st) is the value associated with default.
V D(b, a, s) = max
g,τ
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (0, a
′
, s
′
)dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s) (2.24)
s.t. gd = τdcd + α(b, a, s)b (2.25)
ul
uc
=
h(A)Fl(l
∗
d)
(1 + τd)
(2.26)
c∗d =
h(A)F (l∗d)
(1 + τd)
(2.27)
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When the government decides to default on its debt, it is excluded from financial markets
and suffers productivity loss h(A) < A. Debt renegotiation is initiated at the time of
default and recovery rates are determined. When the government repays the recovered debt
(α(b, a, s)b) to investors, it can re-access the international financial markets no debt in the
next period.
2.3.7 Debt Renegotiation Problem
The debt renegotiation takes the form of a generalized Nash bargaining problem. When the
government decides to default on its debt, it is excluded from international financial markets
and initiates a debt restructuring process to determine the recovery rates. We assume that
debt renegotiation takes places only once for each default. Furthermore, there is no delay
in debt renegotiation in that it takes only one period to determine. The government can
re-access international financial markets in the next period.9 Under Nash bargaining, the
value of the debt renegotiation agreement is follows:
V d(b, a, s) = max
g,τ
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V (0, a
′
, s
′
)dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s) (2.28)
s.t. g = τc∗d + α(b, a, s)b (2.29)
ul
uc
=
h(A)Fl(l
∗
d)
(1 + τd)
(2.30)
c∗d =
h(A)F (l∗d)
(1 + τd)
(2.31)
The value of the debt renegotiation agreement takes into account two costs of default, the
productivity loss (h(A)) and the one period financial exclusion. However, they can reaccess
the international financial markets next period with no debt obligations attached as seen
by b
′
= 0 in the value of next period, V (0, a
′
, s
′
). Now we characterize the threat point of
debt renegotiation when both parties cannot resolve the debt renegotiation process. When
9Delays in debt renegotiatioin: Benjamin and Wright (2008), Bi (2008), Bai and Zhang (2013), Asonuma
and Trebesch (2014), Asonuma and Joo (2014)
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the government does not reach an agreement on recovery rates with foreign creditors, it
is forced to stay in financial autarky forever with associated productivity loss.10 Foreign
creditors also receive nothing.
The value of financial autarky is as follows:
V aut(a, s) = max
g,τ
u(c∗, g, 1− l∗) + β
∫
V aut(a
′
, s
′
)dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s) (2.32)
s.t. g = τc∗d (2.33)
ul
uc
=
h(A)Fl(l
∗
d)
(1 + τd)
(2.34)
c∗d =
h(A)F (l∗d)
(1 + τd)
(2.35)
For any debt recovery rate, the surplus for the country, ∆B, is defined by the difference
between the value of debt renegotiation, V d(b, a, s) and the value of financial autarky,
V aut(a, s) such that,
∆B(b, a, s) = V d(b, a, s)− V aut(a, s) (2.36)
The surplus to the risk-neural foreign investor, ∆L, is the recovered debt from the debt
renegotiation.
∆L(b, a, s) = −α(b, a, s)b (2.37)
We follow Yue (2010) in assigning bargaining power in that the government has a bar-
gaining power θ and foreign investors have bargaining power 1− θ. The bargaining power
parameter summarizes the institutional arrangement or outside option for investors during
debt renegotiation process.11 We define the bargaining set Θ ∈ [0, 1] such that the renego-
10The enforcement of financial autarky is discussed Bulow and Rogoff (1989), Kletzer and Wright (2001),
Wright (2005)
11Benjamin and Wright (2009) emphasize the time-varying bargaining power to derive the delays in debt
renengotiation outcomes
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tiation joint surplus has a unique optimum for any given amount of debt (b), TFP shock
(a), and news shock (s). Then the recovery rate α(b, a, s) solves following Nash bargaining
problem:
α(b, a, s) = argmax
α
[((∆B(b, a, s))θ(∆L(b, a, s))1−θ] (2.38)
s.t. ∆B(b, a, s) > 0 (2.39)
∆L(b, a, s) > 0 (2.40)
Since the debt recovery schedule that maximizes the joint surplus depends on the govern-
ment’s level of debt, the TFP shock, and the news shock, the renegotiation provides better
insurance to the country if it chooses to default.
2.3.8 Foreign Investor’s Problem
Risk neutral foreign investors choose next period’s debt to maximize the expected profits
for a given sovereign bond price schedule. Given the expected default probability λ(b
′
, a, s)
and the expected recovery rates α(b;, a, s) that foreign investors can expect to recover in
times of default, the expected profits are as follows:
pi(b
′
, a, s) =
 q(b
′
, a, s)b
′ − 11+r b
′
if b
′ ≥ 0
[1−λ(b′ ,a,s)+λ(b′ ,a,s)α(b′ ,a,s)]
1+r (−b
′
)− q(b′ , a, s)(−b′) if b′ > 0
(2.41)
Since we assume completely competitive sovereign debt markets, we impose a zero profit
condition to derive the following price function.
q(b
′
, a, s) =

1
1+r if b
′ ≥ 0
1−λ(b′ ,a,s)
1+r +
λ(b
′
,a,s)α(b
′
,a,s)
1+r if b
′
> 0
(2.42)
When the government has savings (i.e. b
′
> 0), the government is guaranteed to get
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repayment from the foreign investors. When the government has debt to repay, the foreign
investors should take into account the fact that the government strategically chooses to
default if the economy goes bad. The second term of equation 2.42 takes this possibility
into account with the expected recovered debt.
The bond price function lies in [0, 11+r ] since 0 < λ(b
′
, a, s) < 1 and 0 < α(b
′
, a, s) < 1.
The sovereign bond spread is defined as the difference between the country interest rate
and risk-free rate, s(b
′
, a, s) = rs(b
′
, a, s)− r.
2.3.9 Recursive Equilibrium
We define a stationary recursive equilibrium.
Definition 2.3.1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of value functions for (i) the country’s
value function V ∗(b, a, s) (together with V ∗R(b, a, s) and V ∗D(a, s) ), (ii) a set of policy
functions for government default decision set D∗(b, s), optimal asset holdings b′∗(b, a, s),
optimal government consumptions g∗(b, a, s), g∗D(b, a, s) consumption tax rate τ∗(b, a, s),
τ∗D(b, a, s), (iii) a set of policy functions for household’s private consumption c∗(b, a, s) and
household’s labor supply l∗(b, a, s), (iv) bond pricing functions q∗(b′ , a, s), (v) recovery rate
α∗(b,Kg, a)
such that
[1] Given the government policies of government consumption g∗(b, a, s) and consump-
tion tax policy τ∗(b, a, s), and bond price function q∗(b′ , a, s), the household policies of
private consumption c∗(b, a, s) and labor supply decisions l∗(b, a, s) solve the household’s
problem.
[2]. Given the bond price function q∗(b′ , a, s), and household consumption c∗(b, a, s) and
labor supply decision l∗(b, a, s), the value function V ∗(b, a, s), asset positions b∗′(b, a, s),
government consumption g∗(b, a, s), and consumption tax rates τ(b, a, s), and default set
D∗(b, s) satisfy the country’s optimization problem.
[3]. Given the bond price function q∗(b′ , a, s), the country’s value function V ∗(b, a, s),
the recovery rates α∗(b, a, s) solve the debt renegotiation problem.
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[4]. Given the recovery rate α∗(b, a, s), the bond price function q∗(b′ , a, s) satisfies the
zero expected profit function for foreign investors.
In equilibrium default probability λ∗(b′ , a, s) is defined by using the country’s default
decision:
λ∗(b
′
, a, s) =
∫
D∗(b′,a,s)
dµ(a
′
, s
′ |a, s), (2.43)
The expected recovery rate α∗(b, a, s) in equilibrium is given by
γ∗(b, a, s) =
∫
D∗(b,a,s) α
∗(b, a, s)dµ(a′ , s′ |a, s)∫
D∗(b,a,s) dµ(a
′ , s′ |a, s)
=
∫
D∗(b,a,s) α
∗(b, a, s)dµ(a′ , s′ |a, s)
λ∗(b′ , a, s)
(2.44)
The numerator is the expected proportion of debt that the country pays to the foreign
investor and the denominator is the default probability.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
This section provides calibrations, solves the model numerically, and analyzes the quantita-
tive implications of the sovereign default and fiscal polices. We first calibrate the parameters
with the Argentina data. Then we use the no news case as a baseline model. The baseline
simulation results resemble the emerging market business cycles and fiscal policy dynamics.
Then as we increase the degree of news precision, we derive the equilibrium outcomes that
resemble that of the advanced economy. We define one period as a quarter.
2.4.1 Parameters and Functional Forms
The Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (GHH) per-period utility function is used in
numerical simulations. One of the important features of this utility function is that the
labor supply decision is independent of wealth of agents. In the news shock literature, these
preferences are widely used to derive the comovement among consumption, investment, and
hours worked (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2008).
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u(ct, gt, 1− lt) = (1− pi)
(ct − l
1+ψ
t
1+ψ )
1−γ
1− γ + pit
g1−γt
1− γ (2.45)
The public expenditure gt and private sector variables ct, lt are separable. We set γ equal
to 2 to follow the real business cycles (RBC) literature. ψ is set to 0.455, implying a Frisch
labor supply elasticity of 2.22, following Mendoza (1991) and Mendoza and Yue (2013).
Since the Frisch labor supply elasticity affects the output cost, we will conduct sensitivity
analysis by varying the degree of ψ.12 The weight on the public sector pi is set to 0.3 to
generate a public spending to private consumption ratio, 16%, which is usually found in
emerging economy in Latin America.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) shock is assumed to follow a simple AR(1) process to
capture the Argentina output process from 1970 to 2007.
ln(At) = ρa ln(At−1) + σat (2.46)
We set the persistence parameter ρ to be 0.94 and volatility σa equal to 0.015. We approx-
imate this stochastic process as discrete Markov chains of 11 equally spaced grids by using
the quadrature method of Tauchen and Hussey (1991)
The discount factor β=0.95 is calibrated to match the default probability of Argentina,
3 %.13
The cost of default is specified as in Arellano (2008). When the government defaults on
its debt, the productivity of the country decreases. In the model, TFP is reduced by φ.
12Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) investigate the importance of labor supply elasticity as a
source of business cycles and the divergence between macro and micro analysis.
13Argentina defaulted three times from 1900 to 2005, matching 3 % of default risk annually. (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2010). In sovereign debt default literature, the discount factor ranges from 0.6 to 0.99. Low β
is usually used to match high debt default probability with high interest rates which is very hard to match
at the same time. Low value of β can be justified in emerging economy because they tend to experience
high structural break in government policies, regime switches which contributes myopic perspective on
government.
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Parameter Value Sources
Risk aversion γ = 2 RBC Literature
Discount factor β = 0.93 default frequency 2.7%(Annual)
G weight pi = 0.3 Public and Private con ratio 16%
Labor elasticity 1/ψ = 2.22 Mendoza (1991)
Risk free rate r = 0.01 U.S. quarterly interest rate
Default penalty φ = 0.96 Arellano (2008)
Bargaining power θ = 0.72 Yue (2010)
Autocorrelation of TFP ρa = 0.9 Argentina, 1980Q1-2002Q4
Standard deviation of TFP σa = 0.01 Argentina, 1980Q1-2002Q4
News shock η ∈ [1/Ξ, 0.95]
Table 2.1: Model Parameters
h(At) =
 φE(A) if A > φE(A)A if A ≤ φE(A)
The specification of default cost is asymmetric. Since it is costly to default during good
times whereas it is not costly to default during bad times, countercyclical interest rates can
be delivered in the model. The risk-free interest rates are set to be 0.01 to match the U.S.
annual interest rate.
2.5 Quantitative Work
2.5.1 The effects of news
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium properties of the model. Figure 2.6-(a) and
2.6-(b) show plots of the default probability as a function of current asset positions for two
values of the TFP shock and news of future TFP states.
Figure 2.6-(a) shows that when bad news hit the economy, the risk of default increases
for any level of current debt. Since the bad news contains information about future low
realization of TFP, the risk of sovereign debt increases even though there is no change in
TFP in the current period. Figure 2.6-(b) presents that risk of default is higher when a
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(a) News and default probability (b) TFP and default probability
Figure 2.5: The effect of precision of news and TFP on expected sovereign bond prices. Notes: In
the plots, η = 0.95 and the current TFP shock is at steady-state. Figure 1-(a), the good and bad
news refers to a signal of an increase and decrease of 1.4% in the TFP shock. In the figure 1-(b),
high and low TFP shock refers to lowest and highest TFP shock states, respectively.
country is in a low TFP state. The high degree of persistence of the TFP shock makes
it optimal for government to default on sovereign debt for a given level of debt. In sum,
Figure 2.6-(a) and 2.6-(b) shows that risk of default increases as the country is hit by an
anticipated future bad TFP shock (news) and an unanticipated current bad TFP shock
(TFP). Moreover, default risk increases with respect to the current level of debt.
Figure 2.7-(a) and 2.7-(b) show the debt recovery schedule when the government chooses
to default and renegotiates with foreign investors.
It is clear from the figures that when the amount of defaulted debt is high, it is more
likely that renegotiated recovery rates will be low. As for the effect of news on debt recovery
rates, figure 2.7-(a) shows that positive news on future TFP shock increases the recovery
rates whereas negative news on future bad TFP decreases the recovery rates. The intuition
for this result is that when it is expected that future TFP will become favorable, the
government has an incentive to re-access the international financial markets to make use of
good productivity opportunities and avoid the productivity loss. Therefore, the government
may be eager to pay a higher cost in order to enter the international financial markets and
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(a) News and recovery rate (b) TFP and recovery rate
Figure 2.6: The effect of precision of news and TFP on recovery rates. See the notes in figure (1)
(a) News and bond price (b) TFP and bond price
Figure 2.7: The effect of precision of news and TFP on bond prices. See the notes in figure (1)
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(a) News and borrowing (b) TFP and borrowing
Figure 2.8: The effect of precision of news on borrowing. See the notes in figure (1)
investors can expect higher recovery rates. Figure 2.7-(b) also shows that debt recovery
rates are higher when the government defaults in a good TFP state. Both figure 7-(a) and
7-(b) illustrate that as the level of the defaulted debt increase, the recovery rate tends to
be low.
Based on the results from default risk and recovery rates, we can investigate the effects
of news and TFP on bond prices. When the country receives positive news on its future
TFP state, default risk decreases and recovery rates increase. The bond price increases for
all levels of current bond holdings. The opposite argument is true when negative news hit
the economy. As for the effect of TFP on the bond price, a positive TFP shock reduces the
default incentive and the recovery rate increases. Consequently, bond prices increase.
The borrowing policy is shown in figure 2.9-(a) and 2.9-(b). Figure 2.9-(a) shows that
when positive news about future TFP is revealed, the bond prices increase and the govern-
ment can borrow a higher level of foreign credit for all current debt levels. Figure 2.9-(b)
shows that when the government is highly indebted, the government borrows more in good
TFP states but less in bad TFP states. On the other hand, when the country does not have
much debt, it borrows less in a good TFP state compared with a bad TFP state. From
this figure, we can anticipate countercyclical capital flows when the government is highly
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Figure 2.9: Tax Rates with respect to news. See notes in figure 1
indebted but procyclical capital flows when the government carries small amounts of debt.
Now we investigate the effect of news and TFP shocks on fiscal policies. When positive
news shocks hit the economy, as seen above in figure 10, the government can borrow more
than when negative news shocks hit the economy at all levels of debt. In this event, a
government can rely less on tax rates to pay interest rate payments and government expen-
ditures since the tax policy is distortionary. This leads to a reduction in tax rates for all
levels of current bonds.
When a good TFP shock hits the economy, on the other hand, the change of a tax
rate depends on the level of indebtedness, as seen in figure 2.11. When the government
has a high debt level, the government increases a tax rate conditional on not defaulting on
foreign debt because the government is restricted from accessing the international financial
markets; it is thus exhibiting a procyclical tax policy. However, when the government has a
low level of debt, the risk of default is low and the government can access the international
financial markets even when hit by negative TFP shock. This leads to a counter-cyclical
tax policy in the spirit of incomplete markets without default risk (Huggett, (1993))
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Figure 2.10: Tax Rates with respect to TFP. See notes in figure 1
2.5.2 Simulation results: long-run analysis
We conduct 1000 rounds of simulation with 2000 periods per round, and we extract 80
observations before and 25 observations after each default in stationary distribution to
compute equilibrium statistics.14
In the baseline model, we present two results. The first one is the simulation results
coming from the no news case (s = 1|Ξ|) in which the parameters are calibrated. Then we
show another set of results where the agents can anticipate future TFP state very accurately,
(s = 0.95). Then we compare the simulation results with Arellano (2008), Yue (2010), and
Durdu et al. (2013).
14see Arellano (2008), Yue (2010), Asonuma (2012)
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A: Business Cycles Statistics
Data Model Arellano Yue Durda et al.
η = { 1Ξ , 0.95} (2008) (2010) (2013)
Business Cycles
Priv C Std./GDP Std. 1.03 {1.06, 1.06 } 1.10 1.04 {1.06, 0.99}
Trade Balance/GDP Std. 2.75 {0.80, 1.56 } 1.50 2.81
Corr.(TB,GDP) -0.39 {-0.46, -0.18} -0.25 -0.16 [-0.27, 0.19]
Corr.(Private C,GDP) {0.99, 0.97 } - - -
Avg. Debt/GDP Ratio (%) 46.5/9.54 {10.0, 12.6 } 5.95 10.13
Bonds Spreads
and Debt Reduction
Corr.(Spread, GDP) -0.43 {-0.32, -0.14 } -0.29 1.11 {-0.35, 0.17}
Avg Bond Spreads (%) 7.17 {3.90,3.14} 3.58 1.86 -
Bond Spread Std (%) 2.67 {7.73,7.02} 6.36 1.58 -
Average Exclusion (years) 3.5 0.25 0.89 0.25 -
Target Statistics
Default Frequency (%) 2.7 {2.8,2.8} 3 2.67 3
Avg Recovery Rates (%) 27 {53,48} - 27.31 -
Source: Arellano (2008), Yue (2010), Durdu et al. (2013), Datastream, IMF WEO
Table 2.2: Simulation results
The calibrated model matches with the business cycle statistics of developing countries
(Neumeyer and Perri, (2005)). In an emerging market, private consumption volatility is
larger than output volatility. We can capture this feature as previous studies. The cyclicality
of the trade balance is negative in that when a country is a good state, it borrows from the
financial markets whereas it is difficult to access the international financial markets when
a country is in a bad state.
The average debt to output ratio is not reasonable to compare with the data. In the
data, it is around 45% whereas we only can generate around 10%. Since we assume one
period debt, it is hard to get a high level of debt. Previous papers show similar results as
Arellano (2008) generate 5.59% and Yue (2010) 10.03% which is 4-8 times less than realistic
debt levels of Argentina. 15
Countercyclical interest rates are generated by our baseline model. High default risk
15Achieving a high debt to output ratio with reasonable default frequency is hard work in a quantitative
sovereign default model. Various attempts are exercised. D’Erasmo (2008) introduced asymmetric infor-
mation regarding political states and multi-period debt reneogtiation process to generate 50% of empirical
relevant debt to output ratio. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) introduced multi-period sovereign bonds to
generate relevant debt to output ratio but with very high default frequency.
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Model with no news Model with high pecision
Fiscal Variables
Government Exp Std./GDP Std. 1.16 1.30
Corr.(Government Exp,GDP) 0.9 0.81
Consumption Tax Std. 0.9 1.50
Corr.(Consumption Tax,GDP) -0.51 -0.22
Table 2.3: Fiscal Policy
and low recovery rates increase the cost of credit in bad times. Furthermore, asymmetric
default costs (Arellano (2008)) makes it less costly to default in bad times. As a result,
the government cannot borrow much during bad times.16 Average bond spreads are 3.9%
with default frequency 2.8%. Bond spread volatility is 7.73% which is higher than reported
in the data but is similar to the findings of Arellano (2008). The average exclusion period
is one quarter since we assumed that the government is excluded only one period and can
access the international financial markets in the next period.17 Average recovery rate is
53%. This is high compared to the Argentina case where the recovery rates are around
30%. The average recovery rates for all default cases from 1980 to 2000 are 60% 18
Now we investigate the simulation results of fiscal policy dynamics. The average tax
rates are lower in transparent economies. This can be justified by the fact that a more
accurate economy can accumulate a high debt and can rely less on tax revenues to repay debt
payments and government expenditures. The correlation between government expenditure
and output is high in the model of no news. In this model, the TFP shock drives the
economy, and when it is hit by the positive TFP shock, government consumption also tends
to increase at the same rate. However, when the news shock is introduced, government
expenditures can increase even though there is no current TFP shock, therefore, leading
to low correlation between government spending and output. Likewise, the correlation
between tax rates and output follows the same logic in that when negative TFP shock is
16Mendoza and Yue (2013) introduced incomplete complementarities between domestic and foreign inter-
mediate goods and successful in endogenizing asymmetric default cost caused by efficiency loss.
17Benjamin and Wright (2008), Cruces and Trebesch. (2013)
18Gelos (2013), Benjamin and Wright (2009), Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
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(a) Correlation between GDP and Government Expen-
diture
(b) Correlation between GDP and Tax rates
Figure 2.11: Cyclicality of Government Spending and Tax Policy
revealed in the current period, the risk of default increases and prevents the government
from borrowing from foreign investors. Thus high procyclical tax policy is generated within
less accurate economies. The degree of procyclicality, however, is reduced from -0.51 to
-0.22 as the precision of news improves.
2.5.3 News precision and development of economy
In this subsection, we provide equilibrium properties of business cycles and fiscal policies
with respect to a degree of news precision. The degree of news precision is captured by the
η in the model. η= 1|Ξ| implies no information content from the signal and η=1 stands for
perfect information about one-period ahead TFP state.
The fiscal policy exhibits patterns in that tax rates tend to be lower in a high precision
news economy than in a low precision news economy. The reason for this result is that
the government can borrow foreign credit more cheaply for any given amount of debt.
This implies that a government can rely less on tax revenues conditional on not defaulting.
Therefore, the tax rate in a high precision news economy tends to be lower than in a low
precision news economy.
Now we investigate how the precision of news affects business cycle and fiscal policies
as we vary the degree of η.
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(a) Cyclicaltiy of Trade Balance (b) Cyclicality of Debt to Output ratio
Figure 2.12: Cyclicality of Trade Balance and Debt to Ouptput Ratio
Figure 2.12 (a) shows that as news precision increases, the correlation between govern-
ment spending and output decreases and thus creates less procyclical government spending.
When a signal does not contain any information about the future TFP, the correlation
between government expenditure and output is almost 1 whereas it is close to .0.8 in a
very precise economy. This is still high compared to the data, but it is moving in the right
direction of a developed economy.
The cyclicality of tax policy also exhibits a difference between developing and developed
countries in the figure 2.12 (b). When precision of news is very precise, it is almost acyclical
and even countercyclical which resembles the pattern of developed countries. As precision
of news decreases, the correlation between tax rate and GDP monotonically increases.
Figure 2.13 shows the cyclicality of trade balance and debt to output ratio. As the
precision of news improves, so the correlation of trade balance with output decreases. This
implies that the government can access the international financial markets more easily
during recessions. Debt to output ratio also increases as news precision increases. As the
risk of default decreases, the government can accumulate a high level of debt.
The volatility of output decreases as the precision of news increases. Since the correlation
of tax rates with output decreases close to zero, tax rates do not increase as much in a less
precise news economy in bad states. Labor supply, then, does not decrease much in time of
recession, making output less volatile. The volatility of the private consumption and public
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(a) Volatility of Output (b) Volatility of Private Consumption
Figure 2.13: Volatility of Output and Private Consumption
consumption are also decreased as a government can rely more on foreign borrowing to
smooth consumption. In Durdu et al. (2013), the volatility of consumption relative to the
volatility of output decreases monotonically as the news precision improves. However, in
our setting, it depends on a relative change in volatility between output and consumption.
This is caused by endogenous feedback from distortionary tax on output which Durdu et
al. (2013) does not have.
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
2.6.1 The role of labor supply elasticity
We examine the effect of changing Frisch wage elasticity on equilibrium outcomes. High
Frisch wage elasticity implies that labor supply is highly sensitive to shock. When a negative
shock hits the economy, the labor supply decrease significantly, resulting in an abrupt
output drop. The volatility of the output, the private consumption, and the government
consumption are high compared to the low Frisch wage elasticity case. Then the risk of
default increases for any given amount of debt. Therefore, the debt sustainability decreases,
generating less debt to output ratio. As a result, default probability decreases by a general
equilibrium effect.
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Baseline 1/ψ = 1 1/ψ = 4
Business cycles
Output Std. {4.32,3.74} {9.94,8.69}
Corr.(Trade Balance,Output) {-0.46, -0.18} {-0.48,-0.19} {-0.31,0.03}
Corr.(Private Consumption,Output) {0.99, 0.97 } {0.98,0.93} {0.99,0.99}
Debt and Bond spreads
Average Debt to Output Ratio (%) {10.0, 12.6 } {-12.4,15} {6.8,8}
Corr.(Spread, Output) {-0.32, -0.14 } {-0.29,-0.16} {-0.29,-0.19}
Average Bond Spreads. (%) {3.90,3.14} {3.71,3.37} {3.21,1.74}
Bond Spread Std. (%) {7.73,7.02} {6.01,6.33} {7.60,4.88}
Fiscal Variables
Government Exp Std. {5.68,5.53} {10.10,9.40}
Corr.(Government Exp,Output) {0.9, 0.81} {0.83,0.73} {0.95,0.88}
Corr.(Consumption Tax,Output) {-0.51, -0.22} {,-0.23} {,0.003}
Table 2.4: Sensitive analysis:labor supply elasticity
2.7 Conclusion
Developing countries tend to have procyclical fiscal policies whereas developed countries ex-
hibit acyclical or countercyclical fiscal policies. This paper explains this stylized fact within
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that explicitly incorporates endogenous
fiscal policy and news shock in a small open economy of limited commitment. Quantitative
analysis shows that news shock can explain the difference in fiscal policy cyclicality. As
precision of news improves, a government can rely more on foreign borrowing in recession,
dampening a correlation of government expenditure and tax policy with output similar to
that of developed countries. Furthermore, this model can generate different business cycle
dynamics between developing and developed countries in that the consumption and the
output volatility is reduced and the correlation of trade balance with the output decreases
as the news precision improves.
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Chapter 3
Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Delay in
Renegotiation and Risk-Averse Creditors
3.1 Introduction
Foreign creditors’ behavior can influence the process and outcome of sovereign debt restruc-
turings. We compile a new dataset on foreign creditors’ risk aversion during restructurings
and show that when foreign creditors are highly risk-averse, restructurings are solved quickly
and with smaller haircuts. To explain these stylized facts, we develop a stochastic general
equilibrium model of defaultable debt that explicitly embeds multi-round debt negotiations
between a risk-averse sovereign and risk-averse creditors. The quantitative analysis shows
that high creditors’ risk aversion results in shorter restructuring duration and smaller hair-
cuts. When foreign creditors are highly risk-averse, being less patient, they opt to settle the
negotiations in the current period and demand higher recovery rates, equivalent to lower
haircuts since their outside option associated with not proposing the offer also remains high
due to the high risk-aversion.
First, the paper introduces a new comprehensive dataset on creditors’ risk aversion
during sovereign debt restructurings. We use two existing datasets on the duration of
restructurings at a monthly frequency in Asonuma and Trebesch (2014) and on creditor
losses (haircuts) in Cruces and Trebesch (2013) both which cover the same 178 episodes
of restructurings on private external debt over 1978-2010. Our new creditor risk aversion
measures comprise mainly two indicators: (1) the term premium on the US and German
government bonds and (2) the credit spread and excess bond premium for US financial
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firms in Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). For all debt restructuring episodes and for each risk
aversion measure, we compute a monthly average creditor risk aversion during restructuring
from the announcement to the completion of restructurings as in Asonuma and Trebesch
(2014)
Two new stylized facts on the foreign creditors’ risk aversion and outcomes of debt
restructurings emerge from our compiled dataset. When the foreign investors are highly
risk-averse, (i) restructurings tend to be completed quickly, and (ii) result in smaller haircuts
(higher recovery rates). These findings are obtained from the panel regressions controlling
other macroeconomic and financial market variables.
These new empirical findings pose important questions in the literature of sovereign
debt restructurings. Why are restructurings solved more quickly when the foreign credi-
tors are highly risk-averse? In a similar vein, why are agreed haircuts (recovery rates) at
restructurings high (low) when the sovereign debtor is negotiating with highly risk-averse
creditors?
In order to answer two important questions in debt restructuring literature, we build
a stochastic general equilibrium model with the debtors endogenous default choice that
embeds explicitly a multi-round debt renegotiation between a sovereign debtor and creditors.
The fundamental structure of the model builds on recent quantitative analysis of sovereign
debt such as Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), and Tomz and Wright (2007),
which is based on classical setup of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
3.2 Literature Review
The theoretical parts of model is in line with theoretical work on sovereign debt restructur-
ings that model the outcome of default and debt renegotiation as a bargaining game between
a sovereign debtor and its creditors.1 In particular, paper contributes to the literature by
explaining an additional degree of delays arise to risk-averse behavior of creditors. In par-
1For example, Bulow and Rogoff, (1989), Benjamin and Wright, (2009), Kovrijnykh and Szentes (2007),
Bi (2008), Bai and Zhang (2010), D’Erasmo (2010), Yue (2010), Pitchford and Wright (2012), Asonuma
(2012), Hatchondo et al. (2014) and Asonuma and Trebesch (2014).
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ticular, the paper relates to Benjamin and Wright (2009), Bi (2008), and Bai and Zhang
(2010) which embed a multi-round bargaining game to analyze delay in debt renegotiations.
Benjamin and Wright (2009) explain that delays arise due to the same commitment issues
such as the borrowers limited ability to repay the newly issued debt, while Bi (2008) finds
that delays can be beneficial for both parties in that they allow the economy to recover from
a crisis first and make more resources available to settle the renegotiation. In a different
set-up, Bai and Zhang (2010) show that secondary market plays an information revelation
role to shorten the costly delays. This paper contributes to the literature by explaining an
additional degree of delays arise to risk-averse behavior of creditors.
The second stream of literature studies sovereign debt and risk-averse creditors. Borri
and Verdelhan (2009), Lizarazo (2013), Pouzo and Presno (2011), and Asonuma (2014).
Gilchrist et al. (2012) analyze the case of risk-averse lenders and show that risk aver-
sion allows the model to generate spreads larger than default probabilities, as observed in
emerging markets. Borri and Verdelhan (2009) consider risk aversion with external habit
preference, while Lizarazo (2013) assumes decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and
Asonuma (2014) presumes constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).2 On the contrary, Pouzo
and Presno (2011) introduce fears about model misspecification for the lenders. What dis-
tinguishes this current paper with these work is that we explore how creditors risk aversion
influences debt restructuring process.
The paper also contributes to empirical literature on sovereign debt restructurings3
Benjamin and Wright (2009) first document a new perspective on the relationship between
restructuring delay and haircut size and Asonuma and Trebesch (2014) show that preemp-
tive restructurings have much lower haircuts and shorter durations. Cruces and Trebesch
(2013) shows that restructurings involving higher haircuts are associated with significantly
higher subsequent bond yield spreads and longer periods of capital market exclusion. On
2Gilchrist et al. (2012) examine theoretically and quantitatively the relationship between sovereign bond
spreads, local economic activity, and global financial risk.
3There are some work on sovereign debt restructurings which apply detailed case studies such as
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, 2008), Finger and Mecagni (2007), Diaz-Cassou et al. (2008), Panizza
et al. (2009), Das et al. (2012), and Erce (2013).
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the contrary, Gelos et al. (2011) show that probability of market access after a default is not
influenced by a country’s frequency of defaults, and that a default, if resolved quickly, does
not reduce significantly the probability of tapping the markets.4 The current paper differs
from the existing literature in that we find newly that restructurings tend to be finalized
and are associated with low haircuts if completed when liquidity at the global financial
markets is limited, i.e. global interest rates are high.
3.3 Stylized Facts and Empirical Analysis
In this section, we find two new stylized facts on sovereign debt restructurings: restructur-
ings tend to be protracted when creditors income is high . Moreover, haircuts are smaller
(recovery rates are higher) if creditors are facing high income.
Our empirical analysis uses two sets of data. One of them is data on duration and
haircuts from Asonuma and Trebesch (forthcoming) and Cruces and Trebesch (2013).5 As
defined in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007), haircuts measure the market value of the
new instruments, plus any cash payment received, to the net present value (NPV) of the
remaining contractual payments on the old instruments (inclusive of any principal or interest
arrears) using the yield of the new instrument.6 Duration corresponds to the number of
months from the start of distress (default or announcement of a restructuring) until the
completion of the debt restructuring process (debt exchange) as specified in Asonuma and
Trebesch (forthcoming).
The other is monthly data on creditors GDP growth rate and risk aversion indicators.
These are (i) US GDP growth rate from Bureau of Economic Analysis (US), (ii) German
GDP growth rate from Federal Statistical Office (Germany), (iii) Gilchrist and Zakrajsek
4Trebesch (2013) suggests that sovereigns factors such as political instability, weak institutions and strate-
gic government behavior influence delays in restructurings more than and creditor characteristics.
5Asonuma and Trebesch (forthcoming) compile two separate datasets on haircuts by Cruces and Trebesch
(2013) and the monthly data on restructuring by Trebesch (2013). They also provide classified data on
preemptive and post-default restructurings.
6In contrast, financial market participants use haircut measures which compare the market value of the
new debt and cash received to the sum of outstanding face value of the old debt and past due interest.
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Table 3.1: Duration, Haircuts and Investors’ Risk Aversion for Restructuring in 1978-2010. Sources:
Asonuma and Trebesch (2014), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Cruces and
Trebesch (2013), Deutsche Bundesbank, and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) 1/ Term premium is
defined as a difference between 1-year and 10-year bonds yields
(2012) credit spread for financial firms, and (iv) German corporate bond yields from Bun-
desbank.789
Table 3.1 reports duration and haircuts of the restructurings, investors’ GDP growth rate
and risk aversion which are average over duration of the restructurings. One new evidence
emerges from Table 3.1: average investors’ GDP growth rate during debt restructuring is
higher than average over 1978-2010 (for the US by 0.6 percent and for Germany by 0.2
percent).
With our combined sample of restructurings over 1978-2010, it is apparent in Figure 3.1
that restructurings are protracted when investors income is high. This is clearly the case
for both average US and German GDP growth rate during restructurings shown in Panel
A and B. Regression lines highlighted in red correspond to estimated lines from regression
results reported in Table 3.2 below. Creditors are willing to avoid a quick resolution and
7GZ Credit spread (CS) measures the disruption of the financial market by exploiting the prices of in-
dividual US corporate bonds in the secondary markets. Their credit spread can be decomposed into a
component capturing the movements in usual expected defaults and a component representing the cycli-
cal changes in the relationship between measured default risk and credit spread. The latter is called GZ
excess bond premium (EBP) which reflects the effective risk-sharing capacity of the financial sector and a
contraction in the supply of credit.
8Gilchrist and Mojon (2014) also construct credit risk indicators for euro area over 1999-2013, i.e., credit
spread and excess bond premium.
9The Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) which is a key measure of market
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by SP 500 stock index option prices. Given that this index
was introduced in 1993, we have even more smaller sample of restructuring episodes.
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opt to postpone the negotiation when they have high income during the restructuring.
In a similar vein, haircuts are smaller (recovery rates are larger) when creditors’ income
is high as shown in Figure 3.2. Both GDP growth rate for the US and Germany at end of
restructuring is negatively associated with haircuts (panel A and B in Figure 3.2). Creditors
facing high income demand lower haircuts (higher recovery rates), while creditors with low
income are willing to accept higher haircuts (lower recovery rates).
With our combined sample of 177 episodes, cross-sectional analysis attempts to confirm
how creditors income process influences duration and haircuts. We have following two
specifications using our indicators for creditors income process (CreditorIncomei) :
Durationi = c+ β1CreditorIncomei + Ziγ
′
+ i,1 (3.1)
Haircuti = c+ β1CreditorIncomei + Ziγ
′
+ i,2 (3.2)
where Durationi and is Haircuti are duration and haircut of debt restructuring i. Zi
is a vector of other explanatory variables. To reflect influence over the whole duration of
restructurings, average creditors income is used for specification (3.1). On the contrary,
to capture effect at the settlement, creditors income at end of restructurings is used for
specification (3.2). On a choice of other control variables, we follow the empirical literature
on sovereign defaults and restructurings, particularly Kohlscheen (2009), Asonuma (2012)
and Trebesch (2013). We have debtors’ GDP deviation from the trend and growth rate of
GDP trend obtained from applying a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter, external debt-to-GDP
ratio and export-to-debt service ratio at the end of restructurings, which are considered to
be key factors in debt renegotiation. To capture the influence of global liquidity, we also
include LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate).
On duration of restructuring, baseline regression results (2nd and 3rd columns in Table
3.2) show that high average creditors’ income during negotiation, measured by average GDP
growth rate for the US and Germany, leads to longer duration of restructuring. When credi-
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(A): US GDP Growth Rate
(B): German GDP Growth Rate
Figure 3.1: Duration and Creditors GDP Growth Rate for Restructurings in 1978-2010. Sources:
Asonuma and Trebesch (forthcoming), Bureau of Economic Analysis (US), Federal Statistical Office
(Germany).
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(A): US GDP growth rate
(B): German GDP Growth Rate
Figure 3.2: Haircuts and Creditor’s GDP Growth Rate for Restructurings in 1978-2010. Sources:
Asonuma and Trebesch (2014), Deutsche Bundesbank, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
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tors are facing high income, they are willing to postpone the settlement to later periods. As
in previous studies on the sovereign debt restructuring, i.e., Trebesch (2010), restructurings
tend to be protracted when external debt is large, sovereigns have ample liquidity (high
export-to-debt service ratio). Both GDP deviation from trend and growth rate of GDP
trend at end of restructurings are shown to positively influence duration of restructuring,
but this is possibly due to that fact that restructurings are completed after economic re-
covery (Bi, 2008). Similarly, lower average risk aversion of creditorshighly correlated with
creditors high income processis highly associated with long length of restructurings as shown
in 4th and 5th columns in Table 3.2.
Next, haircuts are substantially reduced by an increase in average creditors’ income
(the US and German GDP growth rate) reported in the 2nd and 3rd columns in Table
3.3. Creditors receiving high income demand lower haircuts (higher recovery rates), while
accept higher haircuts (lower recovery rates) when their income is low. In line with empirical
findings in the sovereign debt restructuring and crisis literature, haircuts are high if external
debt is large. Export-to-debt service ratio enters with a positive sign possibly because
sovereigns with high liquidity (high exports-to-debt service ratio) are less reluctant to accept
low haircuts in exchange for regaining market access. Despite insignificance, haircuts are
lower with per capita US dollar GDP since countries which are highly developed in the US
dollar term, have higher capacity to repay debt. GDP deviation from trend at restructurings
enters as a counter-intuitive sign insignificantly, but this is possibly due to that fact that
restructurings are completed after economic recovery as aforementioned. Moreover, when
creditors are less risk-averse highly correlated with creditors’ high income process, they
demand lower haircuts (higher recovery rates) reported in 4th and 5th columns in Table
3.3.
Two stylized facts are confirmed by Figure 3.1, 3.2 and Table 3.2 3.3:
• Stylized fact 1: Restructurings tend to be protracted when foreign creditors’ income is
high. Duration of restructurings is extended by about 3.5-4.8 years due to a 1-percent
increase in creditors average GDP growth rate.
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• Stylized fact 2: Haircuts are smaller (recovery rates are high) when foreign creditors are
facing high income. A 1-percent increase in creditors’ GDP growth rate at end of
restructuring reduces haircuts by 2.2-3.2 percent.
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Explanatory variable: (1) US Term (2) GER Term GZ Credit GZ Excess
Duration (month) Premium Premium Spread Spread
US GDP Growth 3.46* - - -
rate average (%) 1/ (1.95)
Germany GDP - 4.80** - -
Growth average (%)1/ (2.38)
US GZ credit spread - - -10.8** -
average1/ (5.04)
GER Corporate Bonds - - - -2.65**
average1/ (1.17)
GDP deviation 1.23** 1.22*** 1.21** 1.05**
from trend2/ 3/ (%) (0.44) (0.44) (0.51) (2.14)
Growth rate 5.67*** 5.50*** 6.70** 10.00***
of GDP trend2/ 3/ (%) (2.15) (2.15) (2.83) (2.14)
External debt/GDP 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.23** 0.36***
ratio (%)2/ (0.07) (0.074) (0.11) (0.08)
Export-to-debt 3.09*** 3.04*** 2.92*** 3.87***
service ratio2/ (0.78) (0.78) (0.85) (0.86)
LIBOR 12-month (%) 11.37*** 8.84*** 8.32*** -3.45**
average1/ (2.25) (2.31) (2.41) (1.64)
LIBOR 12-month (%) -13.65*** -12.51*** -10.24*** -
end of restructuring 2/ (1.91) (1.84) (2.11)
GER term premium (%) - - - -5.93*
average 1/ 4/ (3.39)
Constant 0.47 17.18*** 29.40 -
(18.4) (17.3) (21.9)
Sample 152 152 93 156
Adj-R2 0.43 0.43 0.4 0.55
Root MSE 39.7 39.6 39.8 43.3
Table 3.2: Regression Results on Duration of Restructuring. Asonuma and Trebesch (forthcoming),
Bank of England, Bureau of Economic Analysis (US), Deutsche Bundesbank, Federal Statistical Of-
fice (Germany), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), IMF WEO, and authors calculation. Note: Standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * show significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
/1 Monthly average over duration of restructurings.
/2 Levels at end of restructurings.
/3 GDP deviation from the trend and growth rate of GDP trend are a percentage deviation from
the trend and annual change in the trend obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter to
quarterly GDP series.
/4 Term premium on the government bonds is a difference between 1-year and 10-year bond yields.
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Explanatory variable: (1) US Term (2) GER Term GZ Credit GZ Excess
Haircut (%) Premium Premium Spread Spread
US Growth rate -3.22*** - - -
(%) 1/ (0.96)
German growth rate - -2.20** - -
(%)1/ (1.04)
US Credit Spreads (GZ) - - 6.86** -
(%)1/ (2.99)
GER corporate bonds - - - 3.40**
(%)1/ (1.64)
GDP deviation from trend 0.18 0.26 0.40 0.44
(%)1/2/ (0.26) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28)
Per Capita US$ GDP 1/ -1.52 -1.05 -0.09 0.39
(thousand US$)1/ (1.32) (1.34) (1.29) (1.24)
External debt/GDP ratio 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.33*** 0.31***
(%)1/ (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Export-to-debt service ratio 2.20*** 2.25*** 2.45*** 2.39***
1/ (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44)
LIBOR 12-month (%) 1/ - - -0.63 -2.14**
(%)1/ (0.59) (1.01)
Constant 24.13*** 16.69*** - -
(6.36) (5.78)
Sample 148 148 114 148
Adj-R2 0.33 0.30 0.78 0.75
Root MSE 22.7 23.1 24.1 23.5
Table 3.3: Regression Results on Haircut. Sources: Bank of England, Bureau of Economic Analysis
(US), Deutsche Bundesbank, Federal Statistical Office (Germany), Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012),
IMF WEO, and authors calculation. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * show
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. All regression results are based on least square
estimations.
/1 Levels at end of restructuring.
/2 GDP deviation from the trend and growth rate of GDP trend are a percentage deviation from
the trend and an annual change in the trend obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter to
quarterly GDP series.
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3.4 Model
3.4.1 Timing of the Model
Figure 3.4 summarizes the timing of decisions within each period.
1. The sovereign starts current period with initial debt bt, and creditors’ risk-free assets
b∗ft . We are in node (A).
2. A vector of income yt realizes. The sovereign decides whether to pay its debt or to
default after observing its income.
3. (a) In node (B) (payment node), if payment is chosen, we move to the upper branch
of a tree. The sovereign maintains market access (ht+1 = 0) and chooses its
consumption (ct) and level of assets/debt in next period (bt+1). Default risk
is determined and creditors also choose next-period sovereign bonds (b∗t+1) and
risk-free assets b∗ft+1. Bond prices are determined in the market. We proceed to
node (A) next period.
(b) In node (C) (default node), if default is chosen, we move on to the lower branch
of a tree. The sovereign suffers output costs λdy
h
t and also loses access to the
international capital market (ht+1 = 1). Creditors choose next-period risk-free
assets b∗ft+1 and its price is determined in the market.
4. A vector of income yt+1 realizes.
5. In node (D) (default node), with probability φ, the sovereign has an opportunity to
propose an offer to its creditors. Otherwise, the creditors do. The proposer, i.e. either
the sovereign or its creditors who has an option to propose decides whether to propose
an offer to other party. The creditors choose next-period risk-free assets b∗ft+1.
6. (a) In node (E) (propose node), if the proposer chooses to propose, the other party
decides whether to accept or reject the offer. If the other accepts the offer, the
sovereign regains market access (ht+2 = 0). We move back to node (A) next
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Figure 3.3: Timing of the model
period. On the contrary, if the other rejects the offer, the sovereign remains
autarky (ht+2 = 1). We again move to node (D). The creditors choose next-
period risk-free assets b∗ft+1.
(b) In node (F) (wait node) if the proposer opts to wait proposing, the sovereign
remains autarky (ht+2 = 1). The other party decides whether to accept or reject
the offer. If the other accepts the offer, the sovereign remain autarky (ht+2 = 1).
We again move to node (D). Similarly, if the other rejects the offer, the sovereign
remains autarky (ht+2 = 1). We again move to node (D). The creditors choose
next-period risk-free assets b∗ft+1.
3.5 Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, we define the stationary recursive equilibrium of our model.
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3.5.1 Sovereign’s problem
The sovereign maximize its expected lifetime utility. It makes default/repayment decision
and determines next-period assets (bt+1), given its current asset position (bt), credit history
(ht), and a vector of two income shocks (yt ≡ (yht , yft )), and the value function is denoted
by V (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt). First, we start with its problem when the sovereign has a good credit
record (ht = 0). For bt ≥ 0 (ht = 0), the sovereign has savings. The sovereign receives
payments from its creditors and determines its next period assets/debt position bt+1 and
consumption ct given price of bond q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt). Thus the value function is
V (bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = max
ct,bt+1
u(ct) + β
∫
V (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.3)
s.t. ct + q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)bt+1 = y
h
t + bt (3.4)
For bt < 0 (ht = 0), the sovereign has debt. The sovereign has its option to default its
debt. If the sovereign decides to pay its debt, its chooses its next-period asset/debt position
bt+1 receives payments from its creditors and determines its next period assets/debt position
and consumption ct. If it chooses to default, it will be excluded from the international capital
market and its credit record deteriorates to ht+1 = 1 with unpaid debt (1+r
∗
t )bt next period
where r∗t is the world interest rate. Given an option to default,
V (bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = max[V
R(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt), V
D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt)] (3.5)
where V R(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) is the value associated with paying debt:
V R(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = max
ct,bt+1
u(ct) + β
∫
V (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.6)
s.t. ct + q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)bt+1 = y
h
t + bt (3.7)
and V D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) is the value associated with default:
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V D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = u((1− λd)yht ) + β
∫
Γ((1 + rft )bt, b
∗f
t , yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.8)
Next we consider the problem with bt < 0 (ht = 1) expressing that the country has
unpaid debt appears and a bad credit record. The country is currently excluded from the
international market, is suffering the output cost and may settle the defaulted debt through
renegotiation with foreign investors. The renegotiation process is a dynamic game that may
last more than one period. In equilibrium, this bargaining game pins down an endogenous
recovery rate δ(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) ∈ [0, 1] and the length of financial autarky. The value of staying
financial autarky and continuing renegotiation from period t, V D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) is equal to
the expected payoff that the borrower can get from the bargaining which starts from period
t. We denote this payoff as
V D(bt, b
∗f
t , 1, yt) = Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.9)
The countrys default policy can be characterized by default sets D(bt, b
∗f
t ), defined as
the set of income shocks for yt which default is optimal given the sovereigns debt bt, the
creditors risk-free assets b∗ft and good credit history (ht = 0).
D(bt, b
∗f
t ) =
{
yt ∈ A : V R(bt, b∗ft , 1, yt) < V D(bt, b∗ft , 1, yt)
}
(3.10)
3.5.2 Foreign Creditors’ Problem
If the countrys credit record is good (ht = 0), foreign investor optimally chooses its con-
sumption c∗t , sovereign bonds b∗t+1 and risk-free assets saving b
∗f
t+1. The value function of
foreign investor is
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V ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , 1, yt) = 1Non−DefaultV
∗R(bt, b
∗f
t , 1, yt) + (1− 1Non−Default)V ∗D(bt, b∗ft , 1, yt)
(3.11)
where 1Non−Default is indicator function showing 1 if sovereign does not default and 0
otherwise and V ∗R(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) is the value when sovereign opts to repay its debt
V ∗R(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = max
c∗t ,b∗t+1,b
∗f
t+1
u(c∗t ) + β
∗
∫
V ∗(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.12)
s.t. ct + q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)b
∗
t+1 + q
f (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)b
∗f
t+1 = y
h
t + b
∗
t + b
∗f
t (3.13)
V ∗D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) is the value when sovereign decides to default
V ∗D(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) = max
c∗t ,b
∗f
t+1
u(c∗t ) + β
∗
∫
V ∗((1 + r∗t )bt, b
∗f
t+1, 1, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.14)
s.t. ct + q
f (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)b
∗f
t+1 = y
h
t + b
∗f
t (3.15)
Given the expected default choice of sovereign and expected recovery rates, we obtain
the following bond price functions.
q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt) = β
∗
∫
u
′
(c∗t+1)
u′(c∗t )
[ 1Non−Default+
(1− 1Non−Default)γ(bt+1, b∗ft+1, yt+1)
]
dµ(yt+1|yt)
(3.16)
qf (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt) = β
∗
∫
u
′
(c∗t+1)
u′(c∗t )
dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.17)
where γ(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)is the expected recovery rates at time t + 1 conditional on
sovereigns default.
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If the countrys credit record is bad (ht = 1), the value function of foreign investor is
VL(bt, b
∗f
t , 1, yt) = Γ
∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.18)
Bond price function for risk-free asset for creditor is the same;
qf (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 1, yt) = β
∗
∫
u
′
(c∗t+1)
u′(c∗t )
dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.19)
3.5.3 Renegotiation Game
As in Bi (2008), we model the debt renegotiation problem as a two-player stochastic bar-
gaining game with complete information based on Merlo and Wilson (1995). This is a
stochastic bargaining game in that both the endowment process and the identity of the
proposer are stochastic. In each period, a state is realized and the proposer is randomly
selected. For simplicity, we assume that each player has a constant probability of being
selected as proposer in each period. That is, the identity of the proposer is independent of
a vector of income shock. Let φ denote the probability that the borrower, B, can propose
in a period, and (1− φ) is the probability that the lender, L, proposes in each period. The
frequency with which a player is selected as proposer is a parsimonious way to capture the
bargaining power acquired through ones ability to enjoy the first-mover advantage. The
proposer may either propose a debt recovery rate or pass. If she proposes, then the remain-
ing party chooses to accept or to reject the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then the
defaulting country immediately repays its reduced debt arrears, and then enters the next
period with an upgraded credit standing of ht+1 = 0 without any outstanding debt. If the
proposal is rejected, a new output state is realized and the game repeats until an agreement
is reached. In the case that the proposer chooses to pass, both players enter the next period
and continue the game. We now define some basic concepts of the game. A stochastic
bargaining game may be indexed by (C, βB, βL), where for each endowment state vector
y ∈ Y , C(y) is the set of feasible utility vectors that may be agreed upon in that state. βB
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and βL are the discount factors for B and L, respectively
10. A payoff function is an element
∆(y) ∈ C(y), where ∆i(y) is the utility to player i, i = B,L. As in Merlo and Wilson
(1995), we focus on a game with stationary strategies, that is, the players actions depend
only on the current state and the current offer. In equilibrium, the proposers strategy is to
propose when the proposal would be accepted for sure and to pass otherwise. The other
player acts passively: she accepts when a proposal is made and waits if the proposer passes.
Therefore, we can denote the proposer is equilibrium strategy as a simple stopping function
τ , τ∗ with τ = 0 when i proposes and τ = 1 when i passes; the other player accepts or waits
accordingly. A stationary subgame perfect (SSP) equilibrium is then defined as the players
equilibrium stationary strategies B and L, and the payoff functions, Γ and Γ∗, associated
with these strategies for player B and L.
We then proceed to characterize the SSP strategies and payoffs. The expected payoff
for the borrower B and lender L in period t, shown as:
Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = φΓ
B(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) + (1− φ)ΓL(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.20)
Γ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = φΓ
∗B(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) + (1− φ)Γ∗L(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.21)
Here the superscript denotes the identity of the proposer. So ΓB represents the borrowers
payoff when the borrower himself is the proposer, and ΓL refers to the borrowers payoff when
the lender is the proposer. Similarly, Γ∗B denotes the lenders payoff when the borrower
proposes, and Γ∗L shows the lenders payoff when the lender itself is the proposer.
First consider the case when the borrower B is the proposer. We refer the proposed
debt recovery rate as δBt and the value of proposing as V
PRO
B . When B proposes and the
proposal is accepted, the sovereign repays the agreed amount of debt, δBt bt, immediately
10Merlo and Wilson (1995) assume that the players have the same discount factor. But they also mention
that there is no real restriction implied by the assumption that players discount utility at a common constant
rate. So long as the discounted size of the cake converges uniformly to 0. player dependent discount factors
can always be represented by a different cake process with a common fixed discount factor. So in our model
we allow the borrower and the lender to have different discount factors .
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and enters the next period with a good credit standing and no outstanding debt. Thus,
V PROB is given by
V PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = u((1− λd)yht + δBt bt) + β
∫
V (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.22)
V ∗ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = max
c∗t ,b∗t+1
u(cLt ) + β
∫
V (0, b∗ft+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.23)
s.t. cLt − qf (bt+1, b∗ft+1, 0, yt)b∗ft+1 = yht − δBt bt − b∗ft (3.24)
When B proposes to pass
V PASS(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = u((1− λd)yht ) + β
∫
V ((1 + r∗t )bt, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.25)
V ∗REJ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = max
c∗t ,b
∗f
t+1
u(cLt ) + β
∫
Γ∗((1 + r∗t )bt, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.26)
s.t. cLt − qf (bt+1, b∗ft+1, 0, yt)b∗ft+1 = yht − b∗ft (3.27)
In equilibrium,
δB∗t = argmaxV
PRO
B (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.28)
V PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V PASS(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.29)
V ∗ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V ∗REJ(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.30)
Two parties payoff if δB∗t (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) exists,
Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.31)
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Γ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
∗ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.32)
Otherwise,
Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
PASS(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.33)
Γ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
∗REJ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.34)
The renegotiation settlement can be characterized by settlement sets RB(bt, b
∗f
t ), defined
as the set of income shocks for yt which both parties agree on renegotiation when the
borrower is the proposer given the sovereigns debt bBt , the creditors debt b
L
t .
RB(bt, b
∗f
t ) =
 yt ∈ Y : V
PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V PASS(bt, b∗ft , yt)
V ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V REJ(bt, b∗ft , yt)
 . (3.35)
Similar, the lender is a proposer and we refer the proposed debt recovery rate as δLt and
the value of proposing as V ∗PRO
V ∗PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = max
c∗t ,b∗t+1
u(ct) + β
∫
V (0, b∗ft+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.36)
s.t. c∗t − qf (bt+1, b∗ft+1, 0, yt)b∗ft+1 = yht − δLt bt − b∗ft (3.37)
V ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = u((1− λd)yht + δLt bt) + β
∫
V (0, b∗ft+1, 0, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.38)
When B proposes to pass
V ∗PASS(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = max
c∗t ,b
∗f
t+1
u(ct) + β
∫
Γ∗((1 + r∗t )bt, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.39)
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s.t. cLt − qf (bt+1, b∗ft+1, 0, yt)b∗ft+1 = yht − b∗ft (3.40)
V REJ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = u((1− λd)yht ) + β
∫
Γ((1 + r∗t ), b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)dµ(yt+1|yt) (3.41)
In equilibrium, In equilibrium,
δL∗t = argmaxV
PRO
L (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.42)
V PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V PASS(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.43)
V ∗ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V ∗REJ(bt, b∗ft , yt) (3.44)
Two parties payoff if δL∗t (bBt , bLt , yt) exists,
Γ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
∗PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.45)
Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.46)
Otherwise,
Γ∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
∗PASS(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.47)
Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) = V
REJ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) (3.48)
The renegotiation settlement can be characterized by settlement sets RL(bBt , b
L
t ), defined
as the set of income shocks for yt which both parties agree on renegotiation when the
borrower is the proposer given the sovereigns debt bBt , the creditors debt b
L
t .
103
RL(bt, b
∗f
t ) =
 yt ∈ Y : V
∗PRO(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V ∗PASS(bt, b∗ft , yt)
V ∗ACT (bt, b
∗f
t , yt) ≥ V ∗REJ(bt, b∗ft , yt)
 . (3.49)
3.5.4 Market Clearing Conditions
Goods - Repayment
ct + c
∗
t = y
h
t + y
f
t (3.50)
Goods - Default
ct = (1− δd)yht , c∗t = yft (3.51)
Bonds
pibt + (1− pi)b∗t = 0 (3.52)
3.5.5 Equilibrium
Definition 3.5.1. A recursive equilibrium is defined as by a set of (A) sovereigns value func-
tion V (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt), consumption ct(bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt), asset position bt+1(bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt) , de-
fault setD(bt, ht); (B) investors consumption c
∗
t (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt), asset position b
∗
t+1(bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt),
(C) the sovereigns and creditors decision function τ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) and τ
∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt), recovery
rates δBt (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt) and δ
L
t (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt), and the payoffs Γ(bt, b
∗f
t , yt) and Γ
∗(bt, b
∗f
t , yt)
(D) bond price functions q(bt, b
∗f
t , 0, yt) and q
f (bt, b
∗f
t , ht, yt) such that:
[1]. Given the price function and the renegotiation outcomes, the sovereigns consump-
tion, asset position, and default set satisfy the sovereigns optimization problem.
[2]. Given the price function and the debt renegotiation outcomes, the investors con-
sumption and asset position satisfy the creditors optimization problem.
[3]. Given the bond price function, the debt recovery rates and the strategies of both
players solve the post-default renegotiation problem.
[4]. Market clearing conditions for bonds and goods are satisfied.
In equilibrium, default probabilitiesp∗(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt) is defined by using the sovereign’s
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default decision;
pD(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt) =
∫
D∗(bt+1,b∗ft+1)
dµ(yt+1|yt), (3.53)
Similarly, probability of settling renegotiation is defined by using two settlement sets:
pR(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, yt) = φ
∫
RB∗(bt+1,b∗ft+1)
dµ(yt+1|yt)+(1−φ)
∫
RL∗(bt+1,b∗ft+1)
dµ(yt+1|yt), (3.54)
Expected recovery rates conditional on default choice,
γ(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1) =
[ φ1
yt+1∈RB(bt+1,b∗ft+1)δ
B∗
t (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)
+(1− φ)1
yt+1∈RL(bt+1,b∗ft+1)δ
B∗
t (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, yt+1)
]
+
( φ1
yt+1∈RB(bt+1,b∗ft+1)
+(1− φ)1
yt+1∈RL(bt+1,b∗ft+1)
) ∫
Y β
∗ u(c∗t+2)
u∗(ct+1)γ((r+r
∗
t+1)bt+1, b
∗f
t+2, yt+2)dµ(yt+2|yt+1)(3.55)
Risk-free interest rate is defined as
1 + r∗(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, ht, yt) =
1
qf (bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, ht, yt)
(3.56)
Spreads for sovereign bonds is defined as follow:
s(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, ht, yt) =
1
q(bt+1, b
∗f
t+1, 0, yt)
− 1− r∗(bt+1, b∗ft+1, 0, yt) (3.57)
3.6 Qunatitative Analysis
This section provides quantitative analysis of model. Our major findings can be summa-
rized as follows. First, at the steady state distribution, we show that there exist region
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of passing offer in the state of both sovereign and the creditors income process. Delay in
debt restructuring, i.e., passing proposing . Second, our simulation exercise uses Argentine
default in 2001 and replicates both business cycle, non-business cycle regularities, and delay
in debt restructurings.
3.6.1 Parameters and Functional Forms
We use most of the parameters and functional forms speci.ed in previous work. There is
only one new element in the model associated with a two-country set-up: (i) relative size
of the sovereign. The following constant relative risk averse (CRRA) utility functions are
used in numerical simulation:
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ , u(c
∗
t ) =
c∗1−σt
1− σ (3.58)
where σ expresses degree of risk aversion. We set σ equal to 2, which is commonly used
in real business cycle analysis for advanced economy and emerging markets. The creditors
discount factor is set to δf = 0.98 to replicate the risk-free interest rate of 1.7%. Output
loss parameter λd is assumed to be 2% following Sturzenegger (2004)’s estimates.
The endowment processes are calibrated to match Argentine and the US quarterly GDP
over 1980Q3-2013Q3 from the Ministry of Finance of Argentina (MECON) and over 1970Q2-
2015Q1 from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We assume each exogenous
process stream yit for i = h, f follows a log normal AR(1) process.
log(gt) = log(µ
i) + ρig(log(g
i
t−1)− log(µi)) + ig (3.59)
where growth rate git =
yt
yt−1 and growth shock 
i
g is i.i.d N(0, σ
i2
t ), and log(µ
i) is the
expected log gross growth rate of the borrowers and lenders endowment. Each shock is then
discretized into a finite state Markov chain by using a quadrature procedure in Hussey and
Tauchen (1991) from their joint distribution. We obtain estimated auto-coefficients such as
ρh = 0.26 for Argentina and ρf = 0.87 for the US.
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Parameter Value Sources
Risk aversion σ = 2 RBC Literature
Output cost λd = 0.02 Sturzenegger (2004)
Bargaining power φ = 0.5 Computed
Discount factor (creditor) βf = 0.98 Computed
Autoreg. of income (creditor) ρf = 0.87 Computed-US BEA
Autoreg. of income growth (creditor) µf = 0.0069 Computed-US BEA
S.D of income growth shock (creditor) f = 0.0154 Computed-US BEA
Autoreg. of income (sovereign) ρh = 0.26 Computed-MECON
Autoreg. of income growth (sovereign) µh = 0.0067 Computed-MECON
S.D of income growth shock (sovereign) h = 0.0561 Computed-MECON
Relative size of sovereign pi = 0.025 IMF-WEO
Discount rate (sovereign) β = 0.85 Computed
Table 3.4: Model parameters
For remaining country-specific parameters, size of the sovereign relative to that of the
creditors is set to 0.025 to re.ect the ratio of US dollar GDP of Argentina to that of the US
over 1993-2012. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) report that Argentina experienced 6
defaults in 1820-2004. We specify the sovereigns discount factor βh=0.85 and bargaining
power φ = 0.5 (Argentina) to replicate the average annual default frequency of 3.26% and
a recovery rate of 25.0% (Argentina 2001-5 restructuring). Table 3 summarizes the model
parameters.
3.6.2 Numerical Results on Equilibrium Properties
In this subsection, we report the equilibrium properties of the model. We first present
in Figure 3.5 the equilibrium propose/pass choices made for borrwer’s income state and
defaulted debt-to-mean output ratio. On the vertical axes, “Propose” (equivalent to 1)
represents the case that a proposal is made and accepted, i.e., an agreement is reached.
“Pass” equivalent to 0, on the contrary, implies waiting and hence one period of delay.
As in Bi (2008), the two panel charts in Figure 3.5 are identical, meaning that for a
given endowment of borrower and a defaulted debt-to-mean output ratio, the borrower and
the lender would make the same propose/pass choice no matter who is selected as proposer.
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Figure 3.4: Decision of proposing offer and passing given borrowers income
Proposers always opt to propose when income is high, while they prefer to pass at some
debt level (above 95 percent of GDP) when income is low.
On the contrary, Figure 3.6 displays the equilibrium propose/pass choices made for
lenders income state and defaulted debt-to-mean output ratio. Proposers always opt to
propose when creditors income is low, while they prefer to pass at some debt level (above
75 percent of GDP) when creditors income is high. When the creditors are facing low income
shock, they are facing limited liquidity and willing to settle the debt renegotiation to receive
recovered debt payment in current period. On the contrary, when creditors income is high,
they are having enough liquidity and willing to postpone the debt restructuring anticipating
higher payments upon borrowers high income realization in future.
We now plot the equilibrium debt recovery rates agreed at each state (Figure 3.7 and
3.8). In this figure, a zero debt recovery rate implies that the proposer chooses to pass”
in the particular state. In general, the debt recovery rates agreed by both parties are
decreasing respect to level of debt and increasing respect to borrowers income as documented
in Benjamin and Wright (2009), Bi (2008), Yue (2010) and Asonuma (2012). On the
contrary, recovery rates do not vary much depending on creditors income process. Creditors
income influence significantly on settlement of debt restructurings, but not much on recovery
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Figure 3.5: Decision of proposing offer and passing given lenders income
rates at restructurings as they are technically recipients of payments, not payers.
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Figure 3.6: Recovery Rates Agreed with respect to borrower’s income
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Figure 3.7: Recovery Rates Agreed with respect to lender’s income
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3.7 Conclusion
Creditor’s income affects the outcomes of debt renegotiation. Empirical analysis reveals that
high (low) creditors’ income results in longer (shorter) restructuring duration and smaller
(larger) haircuts. Quantitative analysis explains these stylized facts within the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with risk averse investor and multi-period bargaining
framework. Creditors with high income, being more patient, postpone the negotiations and
demand higher recovery rates (lower haircuts) since their outside option with not proposing
an offer remains high.
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